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Abstract
The labor income share has been decreasing across countries since the early 1980s,
sparking a growing literature about the causes of this trend (Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014; among many others). At the same time,
there has been a steady increase in asset prices. We build a simple model to argue
that the increase in the value of financial assets crowds out capital formation. The
negative impact of asset prices on the capital-output ratio declines the labor share
if capital and labor are aggregate complements. Based on a common factor model,
we find that the global increase of Tobin’s Q can account for up to 57% of the
labor share decline. We highlight three potential factors that operate through the
same theoretical channel: capital income taxes, capitalized market power rents and
corporate governance frictions.
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1 Introduction
The labor income share has declined globally in recent decades. Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014) document that the labor share has fallen significantly since the early 1980s,
across the large majority of countries and industries. Meanwhile, stock market prices have
increased with respect to investment flows and physical capital stock. In this paper we
offer a novel explanation that connects these two phenomena. We argue that the rise of
asset valuations affects the labor share through a slowdown of corporate investment. In
our setup, financial wealth crowds out capital formation and has a negative impact on the
labor share. Hence, our theory is not based on higher capital deepening and aggregate
capital-labor substitutability, as recent contributions in the labor share literature. On the
contrary, we propose an explanation that is based on aggregate complementarity between
capital and labor. There are several mechanisms that operate through our theoretical
channel. We explore three of them: dividend income taxes, corporate governance fric-
tions and the capitalization of future market power rents. We find evidence consistent
with these three specific mechanisms.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the global labor share, according to our data. We plot
the year fixed effects from a GDP-weighted regression along with its 90% confidence in-
tervals. We include country fixed effects to control for countries entering and exiting the
data set. Taking 1980 as the reference year, we observe that the global labor share has
exhibited a clear downward trend only disrupted by the sudden -but short lived- rise in
the early nineties. If we normalize 1980 to equal its weighted average value (57%), labor
share reaches a level of roughly 52% at the end of the sample, implying an actual decline
of 8.9% during the period considered.
There is a growing literature that attempts to explain the decline of the labor share.
An important branch of this literature uses cross-country data and emphasizes the role
of capital deepening. This branch usually assumes a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function with an elasticity σ larger than one, and exploits the one-to-
one relation between the labor share and the capital-output ratio that is characteristic
of the CES technology. In this context, any structural driver that increases the capital-
output ratio has a negative impact of the labor share. Piketty and Zucman (2014),
for example, argue that a persistent gap between the return to capital and the growth
rate of the economy results in a growing accumulation of capital because capitalists save
most of their income. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) argue that the persistent global
decrease in the relative price of investment goods has induced firms to use more capital
at the expense of labor, increasing the accumulation of physical capital and depressing
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the labor income share.1
Figure 1: Global Labor Share
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Notes: Own calculations obtained as year fixed effects (along with its 90% confidence in-
terval.) from a GDP-weighted regression including country fixed effects to control for the
entry and exit of countries throughout the sample. The coverage is presented in Table B1
(915 observations, 41 countries).
The degree of substitutability between capital and labor required by these studies, how-
ever, has seldom been found in the empirical literature. Economists have often estimated
values of σ far below one, which indicate that labor and capital are aggregate comple-
ments. (Antra`s, 2004; Chirinko, 2008; Leo´n-Ledesma et al., 2010).2 Recently, Chirinko
and Mallick (2017) used a sectoral dataset and combined a low-pass filter with panel data
techniques, to find an aggregate elasticity of substitution of 0.4. Furthermore, when they
allow the elasticity to differ across sectors, they find that all the sectoral values are below
1. Also, Oberfield and Raval (2014) use micro data and build up an aggregate elasticity
for the manufacturing sector of 0.7. These results suggest that mechanisms that work
exclusively through capital deepening do not fully explain the labor share decline. There-
1IMF (2017) also emphasizes the role of the relative price of investment goods and other capital
deepening factors. Crivellaro and Karadimitropoulou (2019) emphasize the role of financing constraints,
which is also a capital deepening channel.
2 Chirinko (2008) provides a summary of the empirical literature and lists estimates from different
papers, concluding that “the weight of the evidence suggests that gross σ lies in the range between 0.40
and 0.60”.
3
fore, alternative theories that do not rely on this channel are needed.3,4 In this paper,
we propose an alternative theory that reconciles the decline of the labor share with these
estimates. Instead of looking at the relative price of capital goods or any other factor
that reduces the user cost of capital, we look at the role of financial wealth and its effect
on investment. For the corporate sector, we argue that the widespread increase in stock
prices has occurred at the expense of investment. The intuition behind our argument is
the following: Suppose there is an increase in the value of financial assets. If capitalists
have a preference for wealth accumulation, they will demand a higher return to hold this
additional wealth. In equilibrium, firms respond by reducing investment. The decline of
investment depresses the capital-output ratio which, in turn, has a negative impact on
the labor share if σ < 1.
This mechanism also exploits the CES’ one-to-one relationship between the labor share
and the capital-output ratio. However, our argument is not based on an exogenous de-
crease in the user cost of capital or another expansionary capital deepening factor. Instead,
it is based on a negative general equilibrium relation between changes in asset prices and
the capital-output ratio. The following graphical analysis illustrates the mechanism.
Figure 2: Capital Market
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3Most of the debate that followed Piketty’s Capital publication was actually about the value of σ.
See for example Rognlie (2015) and Raval (2017).
4In a recent contribution, Glover and Short (2017) argue that Karabarbounis and Neiman’s estimates
of the elasticity of substitution are biased because they ignore consumption growth effects during the
period in which the relative price of investment goods have changed.
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Figure 2.a shows a capital market with a standard capital demand and an increasing
asset demand (i.e. supply of savings). In a frictionless environment, equilibrium occurs
when these two curves intersect (point A). Now, suppose that the financial value of capital
increases and that this increase is just a pure valuation effect (i.e. a change in the financial
value of capital, not in the stock of capital). The asset supply shifts to the right while the
capital demand does not shift. The new equilibrium occurs at the intersection between
the asset supply and the asset demand (point B). This equilibrium is characterized by
higher returns and, given the financial gain, higher wealth-output ratio. However, the
demand of capital has not shifted. At equilibrium B the economy has to produce a higher
return with the same capital demand schedule. This produces a movement along this
schedule, from A to C, that increases the productivity of capital and thus the return
to capitalists. The result is an economy with higher wealth-output ratio, lower capital-
output ratio and higher returns. If σ < 1, this economy is also characterized by a lower
labor share. Average Tobin’s Q plays an important role because it captures the pure
valuation effect that triggers the general equilibrium mechanism. This is observed in the
definition of asset supply which, in a market for corporate equity, equals the product of
Q and capital k:
v(r) = Q · k(r) (1)
While most of the labor share studies have focused on channels that work through changes
in k(r), including Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we focus on changes in Q and po-
tential channels that work through them. To illustrate our mechanism vis-a`-vis Karabar-
bounis and Neiman’s channel, we can use the same capital market to show the effects
of a decline in the relative price of capital goods. Figure 2.b shows this scenario. Here,
there is not any valuation effect, and therefore there is no need to distinguish between the
asset supply and the demand of capital. In response to a decline in capital goods prices,
firms demand more capital, which shifts the capital demand to the right. The result is
an equilibrium characterized by higher returns, higher capital-output ratio and, if σ > 1,
lower labor share.5,6 A similar analysis follows for other capital deepening forces that shift
the demand curve to the right.
Figure 3 presents descriptive evidence of Tobin’s Q and its relationship with the labor
share. Figure 3.a shows the evolution of the global Tobin’s Q according to our data by
plotting the year fixed effects from a GDP-weighted regression where 1980 is taken as
the reference year (1980 = 0). If we normalize 1980 to equal the Tobin’s Q weighted
5To be precise, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) do not use an increasing asset demand. So their
steady state results just imply higher capital-output, but constant returns.
6Nothing prevents us to consider forces that change Q and K(r) at the same time. We show below
that this is the usual case for market power.
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average value in our sample (1.15), Figure 3.a displays a Tobin’s Q increase of around
46% (from 1.15 in 1980 to 1.68 in 2007).7,8 Figure 3.b presents descriptive evidence of
this relationship between our two variables of interest. In particular, it shows a negative
correlation between the labor share and Tobin’s Q when we control for country fixed
effects.
Figure 3: Labor Income Share and Tobin’s Q, 1980-2009
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Notes: Figure a is obtained using year fixed effects (along with its 90% confidence interval.) from a GDP-weighted regression
including country fixed effects to control for the entry and exit of countries throughout the sample. The coverage is presented in
Table B1 (915 observations, 41 countries). Figure b is based on a (outlier-robust) sample of 41 countries and 911 observations.
Variables are time-demeaned to control for country fixed effects. Correlation coefficient= −0.32∗∗∗.
Our main argument and empirical exercise are agnostic about the driving forces that
have pushed up asset prices. We just want to see if changes in financial wealth relative to
physical wealth are associated to declines in the labor share. However, we later explore
potential Tobin’s Q driving factors, and we find that the capitalization of market power
rents, the decline of dividend income taxes and improvements in shareholder-value ori-
ented corporate governance are consistent with our hypothesis.9
For our empirical analysis, we use recently developed panel time-series techniques that
account for macroeconomics data characteristics (i.e., among others, long T , short N and
nonstationarity). In particular, we present different mean group estimators which rely on
7Figure B1 in Appendix B shows the country-specific trends of our variables of interest. We can see
that the trends showed in Figures 1 and 3.a document global facts and they are not merely driven by
idiosyncratic factors in large countries.
8Figure 3.a also displays the collapse of Tobin’s Q during the financial crisis. Our econometric
methodology is well suited to control for these kind of short-run variations and, therefore, the long-run
relationship should not be affected by them.
9These factors do not exhaust the determinants of Tobin’s Q. Our mechanism could operate similarly
for other factors that increase asset prices.
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a common factor model approach. In contrast to standard panel data methods widely
used in macroeconomics, this empirical approach deals in a tractable way with endo-
geneity issues arising from the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. We opt to further
control for the relative price of investment goods to compare our mechanism with that of
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).10
Our results show a robust and significant negative impact of Tobin’s Q on the labor share
that can explain up to 57% of its decline since 1980. However, we do not find any sig-
nificant impact of the relative price of investment goods. Like in Chirinko and Mallick
(2017), our results suggest that the decline of the labor income share cannot be explained
by this particular capital deepening factor. We also find empirical support for our theo-
retical mechanism. More specifically, we show that the drivers considered in our analysis
(dividend income tax rate, capitalized market power and corporate governance) interact
with Q and physical investment in opposite directions.11
Since asset prices impact the labor share through an endogenous decline of the capital-
output ratio, our results are consistent with the extensive literature that finds values of
the elasticity of substitution well below one. We consequently conclude that deep causes
for the secular decline of the labor share have to be found not in the accumulation of
physical capital or in investment specific-technological changes, but in the way financial
markets and corporations relate. In particular, the deep causes for factorial inequality
should be found in policies or institutional changes that have increased financial wealth
at the expense of real investment.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The next subsection discusses related
literature and places our contribution within it. Section 2 develops a theoretical framework
that relates asset prices and Tobin’s Q with the capital-output ratio and the labor share.
Section 3 introduces and explains the data that we use in our empirical analysis. Sections
4 and 5 present, respectively, the econometric methodology and the results. Section 6
explores the potential determinants of Q, and Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
10Changes in the relative price of investment goods impacts the capital-output ratio but they do not
change Tobin’s Q. Figure B2 in Appendix B shows a lack of within-country correlation between these
two variables.
11Note that we are not saying that market power reduces the labor share only via markups. We are
saying that the financial capitalization of future markups depresses investment due to the financial wealth
effect described in figure 2. This goes beyond the classic inefficiency of markups. See more later.
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Related literature
Our paper is deeply connected to Piketty and Zucman (2014) for different reasons. They
rely on increasing capital-output ratios to explain the recent evolution of factor shares.
In this regard, their theory is opposed to ours. However, they also emphasize the role of
asset prices and show compelling cross-country evidence on Tobin’s Q. The main concep-
tual differences are that i) we do not assume that Tobin’s Q is equal to one12 and, more
importantly, ii) we provide a theoretical framework where physical capital is crowded out
by capital gains (i.e. capital responds endogenously to changes in asset valuations). Some
of their data is consistent with our theory. For example, they find declining or stagnant
trends when they calculate corporate capital-output ratios using the PIM method. And
they also estimate that, in absence of capital gains, national wealth-income ratios would
have remained stagnant or declined.13
Our mechanism also resembles that of Shell et al. (1969) who, using a version of the Solow
model, show that productive capital can decrease when capital gains increase. In this re-
spect, our model can be thought as a general equilibrium growth model with capital gains.
Our paper is also closely related to Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016) who show, empiri-
cally, that investment has been low in U.S. industries where Tobin’s Q has been high (in
contrast to traditional Q theories). Brun and Gonzalez (2017) use a similar mechanism
to ours to study the impact of market power and capital taxation in an economy with
incomplete markets. Their argument is also based on general equilibrium valuation effects
and they find that, due to such valuation effects, i) market incompleteness exacerbates
the negative effect of market power on investment and ii) the observed effective decline
in U.S. capital income taxes has intensified the negative macroeconomic effects of market
power.
Finally, our paper is obviously connected to all the flourishing labor share literature. In-
stead of looking at the price of capital goods, as in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014),
we look at a different price, the financial valuation of capital, and its general equilibrium
impact on the labor share. In a recent contribution, Koh et al. (2016) show that the rise
of intellectual property products (IPP) capital accounts entirely for the observed decline
of the U.S. labor share, reflecting the fact that the U.S. economy has been evolving to-
wards a more IPP capital-intensive economy.14 The role of the institutional framework
12The Tobin’s Q argument was also remarked by Rowthorn (2014). Also, the distinction between
capital and wealth was the main point of Stiglitz (2015)’s critique of Piketty (2014)
13See Piketty and Zucman (2014), Appendix Figures A71, A92, and A129, available online at http:
//piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capitalisback
14Appendix C discussed in detail to what extent intangible assets affect our analysis.
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has also received strong attention in the study of factor shares dynamics. The literature
has focused on the impact of both labor and product market regulations. Kristal (2010),
for example, finds that the dynamics of the labor share are largely explained by indica-
tors for workers’ bargaining power. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) emphasize that labor
market regulations have a positive effect in the short-run, but negative in the long-run,
because in the long-run employers can substitute capital for relatively more expensive la-
bor. Leblebicioglu and Weinberger (2017) provide causal evidence showing that banking
deregulation contributes to the decline of the labor share. Raurich et al. (2012) show
that estimates of the elasticity of substitution are biased when price mark-ups are ig-
nored. Recent research by Barkai (2017), Autor et al. (2017) and Kehrig and Vincent
(2018) emphasize, respectively, the role of imperfect competition, the “superstar firms”
phenomenon and the reallocation of value added to ”hyper- productive” establishments
to explain the evolution of the U.S. labor share. Our paper complements this research
and shows that financial valuations might have general equilibrium effects on investment
and the labor share, consistent with the empirical literature that finds values of σ below
one. Our paper also contributes to the labor share literature from a methodological per-
spective: We look at this question using panel time-series techniques and controlling for
common unobserved factors.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a model that connects the labor share with the amount of financial
wealth held, the level of physical capital stock and the financial value of capital. Our
model refers to the corporate sector. In this context, financial wealth is the stock market
value and the financial valuation of capital is the average Tobin’s Q. To show the main
result, subsection 2.1 presents a model where average Q is exogenous. In section 2.2,
we endogenize Q. Our environment is very simple: there is a representative capitalist
that accumulates stocks and receives direct utility from the ownership of wealth. The
firm accumulates physical capital and distributes dividends to capitalists. We opt not
to model the problem of the workers since it is straighforwad: workers supply labor l
inelastically, receive labor income w, consume and do not save. Time is discrete.
2.1 A model with exogenous Q
2.1.1 Capitalists
We consider the problem of a representative capitalist household that consumes c, accu-
mulates financial wealth a and receives return r from this wealth. The household derives
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utility from consumption and from the accumulation of wealth, according to the present
utility function u(c, a) = u(c) + h(a), where u(c) is standard and h(a) is increasing and
concave in financial wealth a. Financial wealth is equal to the price of stocks v times the
number of stocks held by the household. Every period, the household decides the amount
of next period stocks s′. Therefore, the amount of financial wealth held at the end of
the current period is a′ = vs′. In this context, returns r are equity returns that satisfy
1 + r′ = div
′+v′
v
, where div is dividends paid by the firm.
In recursive form, the intertemporal problem of the household simplifies to:
V (a) = max
c,a′
u(c) + h(a) + βV (a′)
s.t. c+ a′ = (1 + r)a
(2)
where we have exploited the change of variable a′ = vs′. The term h(a) implies that
households derive direct utility from the ownership of wealth. Specifically, h(a) relaxes
the assumption that wealth only serves to finance future consumption and, under rela-
tively general conditions, leads to an increasing steady state asset demand.1516 In a model
where financial wealth plays a key role, like ours, the inclusion of wealth in the utility
function is an appropriate assumption since the bulk of stock market wealth is mostly
owned by households whose saving behaviour cannot be explained by the standard Euler
equation (Carroll, 1998).17
Solving (2), we get the following Euler equation:
u′(c) = β
[
u′(c′)(1 + r′) + h′(a′)
]
(3)
15Wealth in the utility function was proposed by Carroll (1998) and is used by Francis (2009), Piketty
(2011), Kumhof et al. (2015) and Saez and Stantcheva (2017), among others. In all these papers, the
assumption that capitalists have a preference for wealth is a key modelling strategy.
16Saez and Stantcheva (2017) discuss different possible microfoundations for wealth in the utility
function, including (i) bequest motives, (ii) entrepreneurship, (iii) service flows of liquidity and security,
and (iv) motivated beliefs and social norms. For example, people might derive direct utility from wealth
due to the service flows of social status and power that it provides (Carroll, 1998), or people might
accumulate wealth due to dynastic (impure) altruism (DeNardi, 2004). Brun and Gonzalez (2017) use
an incomplete market model to study the aggregate and distributional effects of changes in financial
valuations. In an incomplete market model, the asset demand is increasing due to precautionary behavior.
17In the standard life-cycle model without bequest motive and wealth effects, an increasing savings
function can be achieved but requires a CRRA parameter unrealistically low (below 1).
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Evaluated at the steady state, equation 3 simplifies to:
1
β
= 1 + r +
h′(a)
u′(ra)
(4)
As shown in figure 2.a, an increasing asset demand is a crucial aspect for the comparative
statics of the model. To preserve the general notation, we we will assume that the condi-
tions that guarantee that a(r) is an increasing function are met.18 Note that equation 4
requires r < 1
β
−1, as in the standard incomplete markets model (Hugget, 1993; Aiyagari,
1994). This is an interesting property because it allows us to interpret wealth in the utility
function as a reduced form for precautionary savings.
2.2 Firms
Our model simply assumes that there is representative competitive firm that accumulates
physical capital k, hires labor l, pay wages w, distribute dividends d to households and
produces output y according to the standard CES technology:
y =
[
φk(
σ−1
σ
) + (1− φ)l(σ−1σ )
] σ
σ−1
(5)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and φ is a distributional
parameter. For simplicity, we assume that the firm does not issue new equity. The supply
of equity s is fixed and equal to 1. The resulting demands for labor l(w) and capital
k(r) are standard and derived from the first order conditions Fl = w and Fk = r + δ,
respectively. Given the CES assumption, we have the standard one-for-one relationship
between the labor share and the capital-output ratio, which is given by:
lis = 1− φ
(
k
y
)σ−1
σ
(6)
2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when the asset demand a(r) equals the asset supply. Since s = 1, the
asset supply simply equals the market value of the firm v(r). Therefore, the equilibrium
returns r∗ are given by:
a(r) = v(r) (7)
In a frictionless environment, the market value of the firm equals the market value of
18For example, if both u(c) and h(a) are CRRA functions, an increasing a(r) would require the risk
aversion parameter in h(a) to be larger than that in u(c), that is, marginal utility should diminish less
rapidly in consumption than in wealth.
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its assets k and the market clearing condition can be rewritten as a(r) = k(r). This
is equivalent to the equilibrium condition in an economy where households accumulate
physical capital and rent it to firms. However, in a financial economy, the financial
valuation of corporate capital (Tobin’s Q) might be different to one, making the asset
supply v(r) equal to Qk(r). At the steady state, Q can be different to one due to several
reasons, including taxes, capitalized future market power rents or financial frictions.19 To
illustrate our general equilibrium mechanism, we postpone the discussion of such reasons
to next section. Here, we just consider the realistic case that Q might be different to one,
which implies the following market clearing condition:
a(r) = Qk(r) (8)
This condition guarantees a unique equilibrium since k(r) is monotonically decreasing and
a(r) is monotonically increasing. The next proposition states the negative relationship
between Q and k shown by figure 2.a.
Proposition 1. The relation between Q and equilibrium capital k(r∗) is negative.
Proof. Consider the asset market clearing condition a(r) = v(r). For legibility, we sup-
press the evaluation at (r∗; Q). By total differentiation, we have that
dr
dQ
=
∂v
∂Q
(
∂a
∂r
− ∂v
∂r
)−1
The first term ∂v
∂Q
is positive and equal to k. The expression in parentheses equals ∂a
∂r
− Q∂k
∂r
and must be positive to guarantee a unique equilibrium. The result is a positive dr
dQ
. Since
k(r) is monotonically decreasing, any change in Q that results in an increase in r will have
a negative impact on k.
Lemma 1. The relation between Q and the labor share is negative if σ < 1.
This result is straightforward. Given that the production function displays constant
returns to scale, any decline in k also declines the capital-output ratio. Given relation
6, an increase in Q that reduces the capital-output ratio also reduces the labor share if
σ < 1. Therefore, our theoretical model predicts that an increase in financial wealth due
to a change in the financial valuation of capital Q can contribute to the decline of the
labor share through a slowdown of capital formation. The next section endogenizes the
Q.
19Our mechanism is not based on Q-theory, where capital adjustment costs affect Q during transitions,
but not at the steady state.
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2.4 A model with endogenous Q
This section expands the model and endogenizes Q. The purpose of endogenizing Q is to
illustrate that several mechanisms can operate through the same theoretical channel. To
that effect, we consider an economy with monopolistic competition firms, dividend taxes
and a corporate governance friction. In this economy, capitalists solve the same problem
as in section 2.1.1, but they pay dividend income taxes. From firm i, they receive after-tax
real returns
1 + r′i =
div′i(1− τ) + v′i
vi
p
p′
(9)
2.4.1 Firms
The monopolistic competition setup is standard. There is a competitive final goods firm
that aggregates intermediate goods using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The relative de-
mand for variety i is yi
y
=
(
pi
p
)−ξ
where p is the aggregate price index, ξ is the elasticity
of substitution across varieties and y is total demand. Intermediate goods firms are mo-
nopolistically competitive. Intermediate firm i produces yi according to 5, accumulates
physical capital ki, hires labor li, pays wages and distributes dividends to households. We
model corporate governance frictions as in Sampson and Shi (2017), with a reduced-form
friction in firms’ discount factor that captures potential agency problems between the
shareholders (capitalists) and intermediate firms. Similar specifications have been used
by Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) and Chetty and Saez (2010), among others. The recursive
problem of each intermediate firm is:
V (ki) = max
k′i, li
{
div(1− τ)
p
+ γ
V (k′i)
1 + r′
}
(10)
subject to piF (ki, li) = wili + div + k
′
i − (1− δ)ki and yiy =
(
pi
p
)−ξ
, where 1 ≤ γ < 1 + r′
reflects the potential agency conflict. Obviously, if γ = 1, the problem of the firm is consis-
tent with the problem of the shareholders. Given that all firms face the same optimization
problem, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium, where all the firms set the same price,
own the same level of capital stock and produce the same quantity. Given the symmetry,
we shall omit subscript i from now on.
Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of capital over its replacement cost. Since our
model abstracts from corporate financial assets and non-equity liabilities, and s = 1,
Tobin’s Q is simply the ratio between equity price v and k. This results in the following
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steady state Tobin’s Q20 (see Appendix A for proof):
Q(r) = (1− τ)
(
m(γ, r) +
F (k(r), l)
ξrk(r)
)
(11)
where m(γ, r) = 1−γ+r
γr
. Under this specification, Tobin’s Q depends on parameters τ ,
γ and ξ and is not constant along equity returns r. Applying Tobin’s Q definition and
equation (A9), we obtain the following expression for the asset supply v(r):
v(r) = Q(r) · k(r) = (1− τ)
(
k(r) ·m(γ, r) + F (k(r), l)
ξr
)
(12)
Note that if the firm maximizes shareholder value (γ = 1) and there is no effective
monopoly power (ξ → ∞), Tobin’s Q is constant and equal to 1 − τ . If there are not
taxes on dividends either, Tobin’s Q is simply one and the asset supply v(r) will equal
the demand of capital k(r).
Expression (12) shows that v(r) can change due to changes in k(r), changes in Q(r) or
changes in both. For example, if k(r) shifts upwards due to a decline in the relative price
of capital goods or lower corporate taxes (both absent from the model, for simplicity),
v(r) will also shift upwards.21 But v(r) might change simply due to valuation effects that
do not shift the demand of capital k(r). This occurs, for example, when there is a change
in the dividend income tax τ . In this case, v(r) shifts upwards or downwards depending
on whether τ decreases or increases, but the curve k(r) remains unaltered because the
dividend income tax doesn’t change the first order condition of capital.22 Finally, v(r) can
change if both Q(r) and k(r) change. This is the case of a lower ξ. On the one hand, it
raises pure equity valuation through Q(r) because future market power rents 1
ξ
F (k(r), l)
are capitalized. On the other hand, if we assume that the current markup also depends on
ξ, the firm will lower the demand of capital k(r) because a lower ξ increases the markup
and reduces the optimal amount of output. The final effect on equilibrium capital will
depend on both forces.23 However, it should be noted the fact that most of the literature
20See Brun and Gonzalez (2017) for a step-by-step derivation of Tobin’s Q in a growth model with
taxes, imperfect competition and other frictions.
21Most of this effect will occur through the direct impact of k(r) on v(r), but note that the value
of Tobin’s Q depends on equity returns, so any change in k(r) that has an effect on r will also impact
Tobin’s Q and will have an indirect effect on v(r). This is the case in expression (A9).
22We also obtain the main result of the so called “New view of dividend taxation” literature. See
McGrattan and Prescott (2005), among many others.
23It is worthy to note that our empirical strategy accounts for the impact of unobserved variables on
the labor share and, therefore, our estimations are not affected by the fact that the markup has a direct
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only emphasizes the markup channel, but not the general equilibrium effect through Q.24
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when the asset demand equals the asset supply. More specifically,
equilibrium returns r∗ are given by:
a(r) = v( r ) ≡ Q( r| τ, ξ, γ) · k( r ), (13)
where the equality is the equilibrium itself and the identity comes from Tobin’s Q defi-
nition. Expression (13) shows that the equilibrium depends on Q and its determinants,
which indicates that valuation changes can have real effects. To understand these effects,
we shall focus first on changes in those determinants that alter Q(r) without shifting k(r).
As explained in the paragraph above, this happens when there is a change in the divi-
dend income tax τ . In response to a decrease in τ , Tobin’s Q will increase and investors
will demand a higher return to hold the additional financial wealth. In other words, an
increase in Q implies an upward movement along the a(r) curve. In response to that,
firms reduce the level of investment. This occurs because the return to equity is paired
with the marginal productivity of capital through its first order condition. The result is
a higher r∗ and lower equilibrium capital expenditures k(r∗).
A similar mechanism operates through a lower elasticity ξ and a lower agency friction
γ. A lower ξ implies higher capitalized future market power rents, which translates into
higher Tobin’s Q and produces the subsequent movement along a(r) and the downward
adjustment of firms’ capital expenditures. In this case, however, this general effect is ag-
gravated by the inwards shift of k(r) that characterizes the optimal firms’ decision when
they enjoy market power, just as we described above. A lower γ also increases Q by
raising m(γ, r). The firm becomes more shareholder oriented, and this boosts asset prices
at expense of capital expenditures. This is another potential mechanism that connects
with the idea that big firms have become relatively more shareholder oriented over time,
whose implications have been widely discussed (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Davis,
2009; among many others) and that has been considered as one potential source for de-
clining investment (Gutie´rrez and Philippon, 2016). What our model shows is that the
asset price valuation that results from such corporate governance friction can put further
downward pressure on corporate investment.25
effect on the labor share.
24Brun and Gonzalez (2017) explore both channels.
25Piketty and Zucman (2014) argue that one plausible explanation for so much variation of Tobin’s
Q across countries might be the different level of protection of shareholders’ rights, with Anglo-Saxon
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Changes in τ , ξ and γ are not the only mechanisms that can have real equilibrium effects
by changing Q. Any other mechanism that increases Q would imply a movement along
a(r) and would change the equilibrium pair r∗ and k∗ in a similar manner, implying simi-
lar distributional effects. This is the reason why in our main empirical exercise we opt to
be agnostic about the determinants of Q and ask the more general question of how asset
prices (Q in particular) are related to the labor share.
For simplicity, we have abstracted from Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)’s relative price
mechanism, but this can be easily embedded into our model by adding the relative prices
of capital goods (RP ) in the budget constraint of the firm:
F (k, L) = d+RP [k′ − (1− δ)k] + w, (14)
where the demand of capital depends positively on RP . In our model, the inclusion of
RP would not affect Tobin’s Q since relative prices are reflected both in its numerator
and denominator. We will show that this lack of relationship is also consistent with the
data. Lastly, to compare our mechanism with Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)’s, we
will also assess the impact of the relative prices of capital goods on the labor share.
3 Data
In order to empirically study the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the labor income
share, this paper combines three different databases to construct our three variables of
interest.
3.1 Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of capital over its replacement cost. Empirically,
we use data from the Worldscope database and follow Doidge et al. (2013) to compute
a firm-level Tobin’s Q as the sum of total assets less the book value of equity plus the
market value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets, which is generally ac-
knowledged as the most accurate available procedure, given the difficulty to obtain data
of the replacement cost of capital. Indeed Chung and Pruitt (1994) find that a simple
market-to-book ratio explains at least 96.6% of the variability of Tobin’s Q -calculated as
countries being those with the highest level of protection and highest Tobin’s Q. This hypothesis seems
to be also consistent with the evidence shown by Gompers et al. (2003) for U.S. firms: firms with stronger
shareholder rights seem to be also those with higher firm value and lower capital expenditures. Later we
empirically check the relation between this mechanism and the evolution of Tobin’s Q.
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the market value of capital over its replacement cost.
A country-level Q is obtained by aggregating firm-level data from publicly traded com-
panies following Doidge et al. (2013) methodology. That is, in a first stage firms are
clustered in 17 different sectors using the Fama-French 17 industries classification, and a
median Q is computed for each industry.26 In a second step, countries’ Q are calculated
as the market value weighted average of the median industries’ Q. The use of industry
medians allows us to overcome the problem of potential outliers in the sample.27
3.2 Labor Income Share
Regarding the labor share, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) have developed a database
of the corporate labor income share for a considerable number of countries obtaining the
data from several sources. However, the use of their database would force us to exclude a
non-negligible number of countries in our analysis. As an alternative, we employ the LIS
variable from the Extended Penn World Table 4.0 (EPWT 4.0).
Figure 4: EPWT LIS vs KN LIS
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(a) EPWT vs Corporate Labor Share
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(b) EPWT vs Total Labor Share
The EPWT 4.0 draws information from several United Nations sources and defines the
labor income share as the share of total employee compensation in the Gross Domestic
Product with no adjustment for mixed rents, and without distinguishing the corporate
sector. Although we are aware of the potential drawbacks of using this LIS definition, the
26Table B2 in Appendix B displays the Fama-French 17 industries classification.
27In order to be safe about potential outliers we just include sector-year pairs where we have data for at
least three companies. Increasing the number of companies required per sector-year does not significantly
alter our Q. In order to maximize the sample coverage of our analysis, Tobin’s Q is calculated including
the financial sector. Excluding the financial sector gives a Q with a 0.95 correlation with our variable.
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high correlation between our variable with the corporate labor share and the total labor
share used by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) -0.88 and 0.96 respectively (Figure 4)-
suggests that this should not represent a major source of concern.
3.3 Relative Prices
The relative price of investment goods with respect to consumption goods is obtained by
extending Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) database. In order to obtain the relative
price in domestic terms, we divide the country-specific relative price obtained from the
Penn World Table 7.1 (Pii
Pci
), which is calculated using ppp exchange rates, over the relative
price of investment in the United States (PiUS
PcUS
). We then multiply this ratio by the ratio
of the investment price deflator to the personal consumption expenditure deflator for the
United States ( IDUS
PCDUS
) obtained from the BEA.
RP =
Pii
Pci
PiUS
PcUS
∗ IDUS
PCDUS
3.4 Descriptive Correlations
Figure 5 shows the country-specific correlations between our variables of interest.28 The
vertical axis reports the coefficient α1 (in %) from a regression ln (Yt) = α0+α1 ln (Xt)+t,
where, Y represents either the labor share or Tobin’s Q, and X stands for Tobin’s Q or the
relative prices. Figure 5.a displays the already commented global negative relationship
between the labor income share and Tobin’s Q. On average, an increase in Tobin’s Q
of 1% is associated with a decline in the LIS of roughly 2%. Spain is the only country
displaying a positive correlation between these variables significantly different from zero
at 5% level. Figure 5.b studies the relationship between the labor share and our other
variable of interest, the relative prices. Although the picture is less conclusive, it suggests
the presence of a positive correlation between the two variables. However, Figure B3 in
Appendix B shows that when we consider the information provided by all the countries,
the within-country correlation is very small. Figure 5.c shows no pattern between Tobin’s
Q and the relative investment prices.
4 Empirical Methodology
Assesing empirically the validity of the theoretical model carries several challenges. This
section explains in detail (i) how we go from the theoretical model to an empirical equation,
28Table B3 in Appendix B shows their descriptive statistics.
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Figure 5: Country-specific Correlations of our Variables of Interest
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(a) Labor Income Share - Tobin’s Q
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(b) Labor Income Share - Relative Prices
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(c) Tobin’s Q - Relative Prices
Notes: Own calculations obtained from ln (Yt) = α0 + α1 ln (Xt) + t, where Y represents the labor share or Tobin’s Q, X stands
for Tobin’s Q or the relative prices, and  is a classic disturbance term. The vertical axis show α1 in %. Dark bars indicate that
α1 is significant at 5% level. The coverage is presented in Table B1 (915 observations, 41 countries).
and (ii) the empirical tools which allow us to infer a causal relationship.
4.1 Empirical Implementation
For empirical purposes, we do not impose a specific production function and, therefore,
we do not restrict the functional form of the labor share to be the one derived from a
CES technology. We simply assume a general multiplicative form where changes in the
capital-output ratio have an impact on the labor share:
LIS = g
(
k
y
)
= a
(
k
y
)α
(15)
In this way, our empirical specification is comparable to Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003).
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Note that we remain agnostic about α and then we do not know ex-ante whether the
impact of k
y
on the labor share would be positive or negative. Nevertheless, contrary
to Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we further endogenize the capital-output ratio. Our
model shows that the equilibrium capital-output ratio depends, among other things, on
Tobin’s Q, and that the sign of this relation is negative. However, and again for empirical
purposes, we do not impose a particular relation derived from the specifics of the model.
Rather, we also assume a generic multiplicative form where the capital-output ratio is
expressed as a function of Tobin’s Q. Following Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we
also include the relative price of investment goods (RP ) as an argument of k
y
.
k
y
= f(Q,RP ) = Qψ1RPψ2 (16)
We use these two forms to obtain an estimable equation of the labor share in terms of Q
and RP :
LIS = g
(k
y
)
= g(f(Q,RP )) = a(Qψ1RPψ2)α (17)
Taking natural logarithms:
ln (LIS) = ln (a) + αψ1 ln (Q) + αψ2 ln (RP ) + Ωit, (18)
or simplifying:
lisit = β0 + β1qit + β2rpit + Ωit (19)
Where lis, q, and rp are the natural logarithm values of our variables of interest, and
Ω is a standard disturbance term. Note that according to proposition 1 and lemma (1)
we expect β1 to be negative. The sign of β2 is expected to be negative if, as assumed
in the model, σ is lower than one and capital and labor are complements. In that case,
an increase in the relative price of capital goods depresses investment and this impacts
negatively the labor share. However, if we follow Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we
should expect β2 to be positive because a decrease in the price of capital induce firms to
shift away from labor towards capital, driving the labor share down.
4.2 Econometric Methodology
Characterized by a small number of cross-sectional units (N) compared to the time di-
mension (T), macroeconomics panel data have been traditionally estimated following mi-
croeconomics panel data techniques under the assumptions of parameter homogeneity
(across countries), common impact of unobservable factors, cross-section independence,
20
and data stationarity.29 However, if these assumptions are violated, results would be
subject to misspecification problems. In order to overcome these potential sources of
misspecification, we rely on recently developed panel data techniques (panel time-series),
which are especially developed for macroeconomics data characteristics (Pesaran, 2015).30
Our empirical framework is based on a common factor model (for details, see Eberhardt
and Teal, 2011, 2013a,b). Formally, assuming for simplicity an one-input model, a common
factor model takes the following form:
yit = βixit + uit, uit = ϕift + ψi + εit, (20)
xit = δift + γigt + pii + eit, (21)
ft = τ + φft−1 + ωt, gt = µ+ κgt−1 + νt, (22)
where yit and xit represent, respectively, the dependent and independent variables, βi
represents the country-specific impact of the regressor on the dependent variable, and uit,
aside from the error term (εit), contains unobservable factors. In particular, it captures
unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity through a country fixed effect (ψi), while time-
variant heterogeneity is accounted for through a common factor (ft) with country-specific
factor loadings (ϕi). At the same time, the model allows for the regressor to be affected
by these or other common factors (ft and gt). These factors refer to both unobservable
global shocks that affect all the countries, although with different intensities (e.g. oil
prices or financial crisis), and local spillovers (Chudik et al., 2011; Eberhardt et al., 2013).
The presence of the same unobservable process (ft) as a determinant of both the inde-
pendent and the dependent variable raise endogeneity problems which make difficult the
estimation of βi (Kapetanios et al., 2011).
31
We can see the previous common factor model as a general empirical framework which en-
compasses several simpler structures. In particular, we can classify the estimators within
two main types: “Homogeneous estimators” where the impact of the regressor on the
dependent variable is constrained to be the same across countries (i.e. βi = β ∀ i), and
“Heterogeneous/Mean group estimators” where a coefficient is estimated for each country
29See Roodman (2009) for a detailed explanation on the potential risks of the popular Difference and
System GMM estimators.
30Although empirical applications of these methods are still not widespread in the literature, it is
worthy to acknowledge the valuable contribution made to the field by Markus Eberhardt and coauthors
in the last years. The empirical methodology of this manuscript relies on several of their papers.
31Equation (22) models these factors as a simple AR(1) where no constrains are imposed to get sta-
tionary processes. Note that nonstationarity could provoke a spurious relationship between our variables
of interest. If our variables are nonstationary, we have to analyze the cointegration relationship among
them to infer any causal relationship.
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and the aggregate parameter can be defined as the average of the country-specific coeffi-
cients (β∗ = N−1
N∑
i=1
βi).
32
Within each group, the assumptions about the structure of the unobservable factors leads
to different estimation methods. For the case of the homogeneous estimators, we consider
the common Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS), the Two-way Fixed Effects (2FE),
and the Pooled Common Correlated Effects (CCEP) estimators. While the first two are
standard in the literature and account for unobservable heterogeneity through time and
country dummies, the CCEP estimator has a more flexible structure, which allows for
a different impact of the unobserved factors across countries and time.33 Empirically, it
aims to eliminate the cross-sectional dependence by augmenting equation (19) with the
cross-section averages of the variables.34
With respect to the heterogeneous models, we consider different mean group estimators.
In particular, we present the results for the Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group es-
timator (MG), the Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimator
(CMG), and the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic CMG estimator (CMG2).
Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group estimator (MG) allows for a country-specific
impact of both the regressor and the unobservable heterogeneity. The impact of the
latter is assumed to be constant, and is empirically accounted by adding country-specific
linear trends (t). Therefore, the estimable equation takes the form:
lisit = β
MG
0 + β
MG
1 qit + β
MG
2 rpit + β
MG
3 t+ Ωit (23)
where βMGj = N
−1
N∑
i=1
βji. As explained before, the MG estimator is computed as the sim-
ple average of the different country-specific coefficients, which are calculated by regressing
the previous equation for each country. However, although it overcomes the potential mis-
specification from assuming parameter homogeneity, the introduction of country-specific
linear trends might not account for all the possible cross-section dependence from the
unobserved heterogeneity.
To circumvent this concern, Pesaran (2006) proposes the Common Correlated Effects
32Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the mean group estimators produce consistent estimates of the
average of the parameters. These estimators also allows for the use of weights to calculate the average.
33POLS and 2FE estimators assume that the time-varying heterogeneity has the same impact across
countries for a given year.
34Eberhardt et al. (2013) provide the intuition behind this mechanism.
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Mean Group estimator (CMG), which is a combination of the MG and the CCEP esti-
mators. In particular, it approximates the unobserved factors by adding the cross-section
averages of the dependent and explanatory variables, and then running standard regres-
sions augmented with these cross-section averages. The estimable equation takes the
following form:
lisit = β
CMG
0 + β
CMG
1 qit + β
CMG
2 rpit
+ βCMG3 list + β
CMG
4 qt + β
CMG
5 rpt + Ωit,
(24)
where βCMGj = N
−1
N∑
i=1
βji. It is easy to see that the first line is the Pesaran and Smith
(1995) MG estimator (without linear trend), and the second line is the way the Pesaran
(2006) CMG estimator approximates the unobservable processes.
So far, we have discussed how to deal with sources of misspecification arising from param-
eter homogeneity and the existence of cross-section dependence. This paper also deals
with the potential misspecification following from a possible dynamic structure of the
relation under study by estimating both static and dynamic specifications. Although Pe-
saran (2006) CMG estimator yields consistent estimates under a variety of situations (see
Kapetanios et al., 2011; Chudik et al., 2011), it does not cover the case of dynamic panels
or weakly exogenous regressors. Chudik and Pesaran (2015) propose an extension of the
CMG approach (CMG2) to account for the potential problems arising from dynamic pan-
els. In particular, they prove that the inclusion of extra lags of the cross-section averages
in the CMG approach delivers a consistent estimator of both βi and β
CMG. Empirically,
we proceed by using an Error Correction Model of the following form:
∆lisit = β
CMG2
0 + β
CMG2
1 lisi,t−1 + β
CMG2
2 qi,t−1 + β
CMG2
3 rpi,t−1 + β
CMG2
4 ∆qit + β
CMG2
5 ∆rpit
+ βCMG26 ∆list + β
CMG2
7 list−1 + β
CMG2
8 qt−1 + β
CMG2
9 rpt−1 + β
CMG2
10 ∆qt + β
CMG2
11 ∆rpt
+
p∑
l=1
βCMG212 ∆list−p +
p∑
l=1
βCMG213 ∆qt−p +
p∑
l=1
βCMG214 ∆rpt−p + Ωit,
(25)
where the first line represents the Pesaran and Smith (1995) MG estimator, the inclusion
of the second gives the Pesaran (2006) CMG estimator, and the three lines together are
the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic CMG estimator (CMG2).35
Likewise, given the way they control for unobservables, CMG style estimators are suitable
for accounting for structural breaks and business cycle distortions, thus making the use
of yearly data perfectly valid in order to infer long-run relationships.
35Chudik and Pesaran (2015) recommend to set the number of lags equal to T 1/3. We consider up to
2 extra lags of the cross-section averages.
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5 Results
This section begins by showing the results of a baseline model (subsection 5.1), where
Tobin’s Q is the only regressor. Subection 5.2 further includes the relative price of invest-
ment in the analysis. Subsection 5.3 provides evidence supporting the interpretation of
our results as a causal relationship, and finally, subection 5.4 presents a robustness check
of our results.36
5.1 Baseline Results
Tables 1 and 2 present the results for our baseline model, where only the impact of Tobin’s
Q on the labor income share is considered. Columns [1]-[4] display the homogeneous-type
estimators, where β is constrained to be the same across countries. We present results
for the standard OLS estimator with time-dummies (POLS), the 2FE estimator and the
CCEP estimator, with and without including a country-specific linear trend. Columns
[5]-[7] present the heterogeneous-type estimators. In particular, we show the estimates
for the MG, and the CMG estimator with and without country-specific trends. As com-
mented before, we estimate country-specific regressions, and the estimator presented is
the average of the country-specific coefficients.
Table 1 presents the estimates corresponding to a static model including 41 countries for a
total of 915 observations.37 Concerning the homogeneous-type estimators, we find a neg-
ative and significant impact of Tobin’s Q on the labor income share in all but the POLS
estimator (where the impact is positive and significant). However, the cross-sectional
augmented panel unit root (CIPS) Pesaran (2007) test and the Pesaran (2004) CD test
for cross-section dependence indicate that the residuals suffer from nonstationarity and
cross-section depedence.38 That is to say, [1] to [4] regressions are suffering from some
type of misspecification, which from our discussion before could be: (i) the imposition
of parameter homogeneity, (ii) an unsuitable structure of the unobservable heterogeneity,
or (iii) that the nature of the relationship is not static. The relevance of the first two
potential sources of misspecification can be tested analyzing the mean group estimators
36Appendix D presents an exhaustive analysis of the time-series properties of our variables of inter-
est. The presence of nonstationary variables and cross-section dependence in our data make the use of
traditional panel data techniques invalid. To be sure that our regression results are not subject to biases
due to cross-section dependence or to spurious relationships due to the order of integration, we will pay
specially attention to regression residuals’ characteristics. In particular, in our preferred specification
residuals are stationary (which is an informal test for cointegration among the variables) and they do not
have problems of cross-section dependence (which indicates that our specification succesfully capture the
unobservable heterogeneities).
37Table B1 in Appendix B shows the specific countries and period under analysis.
38See Appendix D for a detailed explanation of these tests.
24
(columns [5]-[7]). A negative and significant impact of Tobin’s Q on the labor income
share is still present, ranging from −0.053 to −0.06. However, although the residuals
present an improvement in terms of absolute correlation, we still observe cross-section de-
pendence. Stationarity in the residuals is now present in 2 out of the 3 regressions. These
results suggest that, although the introduction of parameter heterogeneity improves the
specification, it is not enough to solve all the potential misspecification problems.
Table 2 analyzes the third potential source of misspecification through the estimation
of a Partial Adjustment Model (PAM), where the first lag of the dependent variable
is included as a regressor. Due to data limitations, we consider 40 countries with the
number of observations ranging from 850 to 885. The first important result is that a clear
negative and significant long-run relationship is observed between Tobin’s Q and the labor
share irrespective of the estimator used for the analysis analysis. The second remarkable
fact is that most of the residuals show cross-sectional independence and stationarity,
indicating the absence of the previous source of misspecification. Given its flexibility in
controlling for the unobserved factors, our preferred model is the one showed in the last
column (CMGt2)) which corresponds to the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic CMG
estimator, where 2 extra lags of the cross-section averages are included in the regression
to control for the potential dynamic bias. Our findings suggest that a 1% increase in
Tobin’s Q causes a decrease in the labor income share of 0.08% in the long-run.
5.2 The Effect of the Relative Price of Investment Goods
As commented before, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) have argued that the global
decline in the labor share can be explained, at least partially, by the decrease in the rel-
ative price of investment goods. They estimate that the lower price of investment goods
explains roughly half of the observed decline in the labor share. In this section we test
their hypothesis by including the relative price of investment goods in our regressions and
compare their mechanism with our Tobin’s Q channel. Tables 3 and 4 show the results.
Table 3 displays the results from the static model. The inclusion of the relative price of
investment does not alter the negative relationship found between Tobin’s Q and the labor
share. With respect to their effect, they present a negative impact under the homogeneous-
type estimators. However, once we allow for parameter heterogeneity, they no longer show
any kind of influence on the labor income share. Nevertheless, similar to the static model
analyzed in Table 1, residuals show cross-section dependence and nonstationarity.
In order to address concerns arising from the dynamic structure of our equation, we esti-
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Table 4: ECM with Relative Prices
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2FE CCEP MG CMG CMGt CMGt1 CMGt2
list−1 -0.176 -0.365 -0.449 -0.5 -0.694 -0.72 -0.812
(0.026)*** (0.049)*** (0.034)*** (0.053)*** (0.061)*** (0.085)*** (0.125)***
qt−1 0.011 -0.005 -0.035 -0.039 -0.067 -0.076 -0.058
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014)** (0.018)** (0.026)** (0.028)*** (0.033)*
rpt−1 -0.032 0.034 0.064 0.15 0.092 0.129 -0.005
(0.024) (0.047) (0.070) (0.091)* (0.115) (0.166) (0.186)
∆q -0.031 -0.030 -0.038 -0.038 -0.051 -0.053 -0.058
(0.014)** (0.014)** (0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
∆rp -0.141 -0.153 -0.021 0.049 0.093 0.05 -0.11
(0.050)*** (0.068)*** (0.065) (0.108) (0.099) (0.107) (0.095)
t 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant -0.106 -0.301 -0.273 -0.277 -0.431 -0.356
(0.018)*** (0.033)*** (0.050)*** (0.084)*** (0.089)*** (0.124)***
Number of id 30 30 30 30 30 29 26
Observations 732 732 732 732 732 700 631
R-squared 0.26 0.57
RMSE 0.0264 0.0228 0.0191 0.0142 0.0127 0.0101 0.0067
Trend 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.23
lr-q 0.0621 -0.0136 -0.0779 -0.0785 -0.0965 -0.1061 -0.0718
se-q 0.0739 0.0428 0.0327 0.0374 0.0388 0.0405 0.0422
lr-rp -0.1826 0.0927 0.1417 0.2999 0.1325 0.1796 -0.0063
se-rp 0.1306 0.1295 0.1573 0.185 0.1661 0.2312 0.2285
CD test -2.4749 -2.0278 4.9547 -0.4678 0.0134 1.0079 1.3218
Abs Corr 0.1884 0.2114 0.2038 0.2170 0.2189 0.2393 0.2466
Int I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2FE = 2-way Fixed Effects, CCEP = Pooled Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects (CCE), MG = Pesaran and Smith (1995)
Mean Group (with country-specific linear trends), CMG = Pesaran (2006) CCE Mean Group, CMGt = CMG with country-specific
linear trends, CMGt1 and CMGt2 = CMGt with, respectively, one and two extra cross-sectional averages lags, as indicated by
Chudik and Pesaran (2015).
CD-test reports the Pesaran (2004) test statistics, under the null of cross-section independence of the residuals. Int indicates
the order of integration of the residuals (I(0) - stationary, I(1) - nonstationary) obtained from Pesaran (2007) CIPS test. RMSE
presents the root mean squared error. Trend show the share of countries where the linear trend is significant at 5%. lr-q and se-q
represent respectively q’s long-run impact and its standard error. lr-rp and se-rp represent respectively rp’s long-run impact and
its standard error.
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mate an Error Correction Model (Table 4), where due to data restrictions we are not able
to include more than 30 countries. Although we present the results for different estima-
tors, we focus especially on the CMG-style estimators (columns [4]-[7]), which allow for
a higher degree of flexibility. The first remarkable fact is the presence of stationarity and
cross-section independence of the residuals, which indicates the absence of the previous
misspecification problems. Regarding the impact of our variables of interest, we observe a
negative impact of Tobin’s Q in both the short and long-run. If we focus on the long-run
relationship, our estimations imply that an increase of 1% in Tobin’s Q would decrease
the labor income share by between 0.072% and 0.11%. However, we do not find empirical
support for the effect of relative prices. These findings support our theoretical model,
and, like Chirinko and Mallick (2017), cast doubts on the decline of investment goods
prices as a driver of the labor income share.
To grasp the magnitude of these results, we can consider that, since the GDP-weighted
average Tobin’s Q in our sample has increased from a value of 1.15 in 1980 to a value of
1.68 in 2007 (46%), and since the labor income share has evolved from a value of 57% to
52% (−8.9%), our estimates imply that the increase in Tobin’s Q could explain between
41% and 57% of the labor income share decline.
5.3 Weak Exogeneity Test
Our analysis has dealt with the presence of endogeneity from common factors driving
both inputs and output. However, it is not uncommon in macroeconomics to suffer from
endogeneity due to a reverse causality problem.39
Traditionally, the literature has used instrumental variable methods to circumvent this
issue. However, given the nature of our data, providing a valid set of instruments is
challenging (i.e. variables which are correlated with the regressor but not with the error
term).40 Therefore, provided that our series are nonstationary and cointegrated, we follow
Canning and Pedroni (2008); and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) to estimate an informal
causality test based on the Granger Representation Theorem (GRT). The GRT (Engle
and Granger, 1987) states that cointegrated series can be represented in the form of an
ECM, which in our case is:
39In our case, reverse causality implies that besides the relative prices and Tobin’s Q affecting the
labor income share, the labor income share has in turn, a significant impact on their values.
40Under the presence of unobservable common factors and parameter heterogeneity, the use of internal
instruments (lags of the variables) is not valid anymore.
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∆lisit = α1i + λ11iuˆi,t−j +
k∑
j=1
φ11ijlisi,t−j +
k∑
j=1
φ12ijqi,t−j
k∑
j=1
φ13ijrpi,t−j + 1it, (26)
∆qit = α2i + λ21iuˆi,t−j +
k∑
j=1
φ21ijlisi,t−j +
k∑
j=1
φ22ijqi,t−j
k∑
j=1
φ23ijrpi,t−j + 2it, (27)
∆rpit = α3i + λ31iuˆi,t−j +
k∑
j=1
φ31ijlisi,t−j +
k∑
j=1
φ32ijqi,t−j
k∑
j=1
φ33ijrpi,t−j + 3it, (28)
where uˆit = lisit − βˆ1iqit + βˆ2irpit is the disequilibrium term. In order to identify a long-
run equilibrium relationship, the GRT requires at least one of the λ’s to be nonzero. If
λ11 6= 0, q and rp have a causal impact on the lis, if λ11, λ21, and λ31 are nonzero, then
all variables are determined simultaneously, and no causal relationship can be identified.
Table 5: Weak Exogeneity Test
no CA CA
Model lis q rp lis q rp
MG
Avg. λ -0.52 -0.45 0.02 -0.50 -0.41 -0.04
ρ 0.00 0.03* 0.48 0.00 0.21 0.60
CMG
Avg. λ -0.57 -0.40 -0.01 -0.51 -0.54 0.00
ρ 0.00 0.15 0.83 0.00 0.18 0.94
CMGt
Avg. λ -0.75 -0.65 0.00 -0.69 -0.74 -0.04
ρ 0.00 0.01* 0.98 0.00 0.12 0.72
CMG1
Avg. λ -0.59 -0.23 0.04 -0.51 -0.58 0.03
ρ 0.00 0.52 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.61
CMGt1
Avg. λ -0.77 -0.12 0.06 -0.75 -0.60 0.05
ρ 0.00 0.75 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.38
CMG2
Avg. λ -0.73 -0.42 -0.07 -0.64 -1.04 -0.05
ρ 0.00 0.32 0.09* 0.00 0.04* 0.56
CMGt2
Avg. λ -0.93 -0.46 0.06 -0.82 -1.20 0.05
ρ 0.00 0.29 0.25 0.00 0.01* 0.44
Notes: Avg. λ shows the robust mean coefficient for the disequilibrium term on the ECM.
Asterisks highlight cases which do not support a causality relationship for our analysis.
Table 5 presents the results for our weak exogeneity test. Column labeled as “Model”
refers to the method used to estimate the disequilibrium term (uˆ). The two big blocks
“CA” and “no CA” indicate whether equations (26)-(28) include, or not, cross-sectional
averages of the variables. Within each block, the dependent variable of the system is
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specified at the top of the column. The information provided shows the results for the
average λ and its respective p-value. As already commented, for a causal effect of Tobin’s
Q and the relative prices on the labor share, λ11 should be different from 0, while λ21 =
λ31 = 0. We find that just 5 out of 42 cases (highlighted with asterisks) are against the
argument of a causal relationship. Therefore, our results can be safely interpreted as the
causal impact of Tobin’s Q and the relative price of investment on the labor income share.
5.4 Robustness
Our study supports the argument of a long-run negative impact of Tobin’s Q on the la-
bor share. In this subsection we prove the robustness of the results presented in Tables
1-4 to an alternative definition of Q. More specifically, in Tables B4-B7 in Appendix B
Tobin’s Q is defined as the Corporate Wealth Tobin’s Q obtained from the World Wealth
& Income database instead of our computed Q.
By doing so, the sample of countries included in the analysis decreases to 9, for a maximum
of 208 observations.41 Despite of this, we prove that the negative relationship between
the labor share and Q found in Section 5 is unchanged and robust independently of the
functional form of the empirical equation and of the variables included (i.e. static vs
dynamic, with-without relative prices). Specifically, the new set of results shows that a
Tobin’s Q increase of one percent decreases the labor income share by around 0.10% in
the long-run.42
6 Beyond the Q: Empirical Evidence
This section aims to provide some empirical evidence on the relationship between Tobin’s
Q and the determinants highlighted in the section 2.4: dividend income taxes, firms mar-
ket power and corporate governance. More specifically, Section 6.1 connects the evolution
of the dividend income tax rates during the last decades with the trends followed by To-
bin’s Q and the capital-output ratios. Section 6.2 studies the relationship between the
last two variables and changes in the degree of market power using both cross-country and
U.S. industry-level data. Finally, Section 6.3 does an analogous analysis for the impact
of changes in corporate governance using both country and U.S. firm-level data.
41Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
42Given the small number of countries included in the analysis, it is not surprising that the CD-test
rejects the null of cross-section independence in some regressions.
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6.1 Dividend Income Tax Rate
Our theoretical framework predicts that a decline in the dividend income tax should in-
crease equity Tobin’s Q, putting downward pressure on the capital-output ratio.43
We check the validity of this mechanism by relating dividend income tax trends with the
pattern followed by Tobin’s Q and the capital-output ratio. The sample is restricted to
a subset of countries due to data availability.44 Most of the countries in the sample have
experienced, on average, declines in the dividend tax rate of around 1 percentage point
per year, with countries such as Japan and Italy reaching levels of around 2 percentage
points per year during the period under analysis (see figure B4 in the Appendix).
Figure 6 presents the coefficients (in %) of the following country-specific OLS regressions:
ln (Xt) = α0 + α1TAXt + t, (29)
where X, depending on the specification, represents Q or the capital-output ratio, TAX
stands for the dividend income tax rate, and  is a classical disturbance term. Figure 6.a
shows that most countries present the expected negative correlation between Q and the
dividend income tax rate. Only in two countries (Korea and Portugal) α1 is positive and
significantly different from 0 at 5% level. Figure 6.b presents the corresponding results
relative to the capital-output ratio and the dividend tax. Although most of the countries
have a positive coefficient for α1, the pattern is more heterogeneous.
43Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012) use a similar mechanism under perfect competition and incomplete
markets.
44In particular, we include in our analysis countries that have at least 10 observations for the period
1980-2014. This implies that the sample coverage could be different among the three variables under
study. Figure B4 in the appendix shows the country-specific trends for this three variables. Apart from
the global rise in Tobin’s Q 45 and a heterogeneous capital-output pattern, Figure B4 shows a generalized
and strong negative trend in the dividend income tax rate.
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Figure 6: Tobins’ Q, Capital-Output Ratios and Dividend Income Tax Rates (I)
G
RC
CZ
E DN
K C
HL
CA
N
FR
A G
BR BE
L
US
A
FI
N
M
EX E
SP AU
S
CH
E NL
D
N
O
R
SW
E IT
A
JP
N IR
L
AU
T
N
ZL
PO
L HU
N DE
U
PR
T
IS
R T
UR KO
R
IS
L
−
2
−
1
0
1
To
bi
n’
s 
Q 
− 
Di
vid
en
d 
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x R
at
e 
 (%
)
(a) Tobins’ Q
IR
L SV
N ES
P
PO
L
H
UN LV
A
PR
T
M
EX A
UT IT
A N
ZL
SW
E
D
EU FI
N
BE
L
AU
S
JP
N
FR
A
US
A CA
N
N
LD G
BR DN
K CZ
E CH
E IS
L
G
RC
N
O
R
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
Ca
pi
ta
l−
O
ut
pu
t r
at
io
 −
 D
ivi
de
nd
 In
co
m
e 
Ta
x 
Ra
te
 (%
)
(b) Capital-Output ratio
Notes: Own calculations obtained from ln (Xt) = α0 + α1TAXt + t, where X represents Tobin’s Q or the capital-output ratio,
TAX stands for the dividend income tax rate, and  is a classic disturbance term. The vertical axis shows the coefficient α1 in %.
Dark bars indicate that α1 is significant at 5% level. Each graph shows countries for which we have at least 10 observations for the
period under analysis (Max. 1980-2014). Luxembourg is excluded from the graph due to be a clear outlier.
The correlations between our variables of interest and the dividend tax rate presented in
Figure 6 are likely to capture also the effect of other unobserved factors affecting both
sides of equation (29).46 In order to further study the validity of the dividend tax mecha-
nism, Figure 7 exploits the cross-country variation by presenting a scatter plot where the
vertical axis displays the regression coefficients relating Tobin’s Q with the dividend tax
rate, and the horizontal axis displays the regression coefficients of the capital-output ratio
with respect to the dividend tax rate.47 We observe a negative relation. This indicates
that countries where the capital-output ratio is more sensitive to changes in the dividend
tax rate experience a larger decrease in Tobin’s Q in response to an increase in this tax
rate.48
Although it is worthy to remind that the goal of this section is not to claim any causality,
the empirical evidence supports the role of the mechanism that emerges from our model.
46For example, a new Government in office could implement simultaneously a tax reform and poli-
cies which foster capital accumulation, this would cause the patterns observed in Figure 6 without any
connection between Q and the capital-output ratio due to the change in taxes.
47These coefficients are slightly different than the ones presented in Figure 6. The source of discrepancy
is that this time both equations are constrained to include the same sample.
48Our results are robust to the inclusion of a dummy variable for the period 2008-2014 and to limit
the sample to the pre-crisis period (1980-2008). Robustness exercises are available upon request.
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Figure 7: Tobins’ Q, Capital-Output Ratios and Dividend Income Tax Rates (II)
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Notes: Own calculations obtained from ln (Xt) = α0 + α1TAXt + t, where X represents
Tobin’s Q and the capital-output ratio in the vertical and the horizontal axis respectively.
TAX is the dividend income tax rate, and  is a classic disturbance term. Both axis show the
coefficient α1 in %. Both equations are constrained to have the same number of observations
(Max. 1980-2014). The scatter plot is obtained after excluding outliers. An outlier is defined
as an observation with a weight of 0 after using the rreg command in STATA. Correlation
coefficient= −0.38∗∗.
6.2 Market Power
Several recent contributions have emphasized the role of market power in explaining the
decline of the labor share (Barkai, 2017; Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). This literature
argues that the increase in markups has widened the difference between the marginal
products and the price of factors. (e.g. Fl(k, l) = µw, with increasing µ). While nesting
this transmission mechanism from markups to factors shares, our framework foresees an
additional, general equilibrium channel. Our model argues that the capitalization of future
market power rents is one of the factors that boosts asset prices and has distributional
effects. This mechanism is based on the assumption that the asset demand is upward
sloping and is conceptually different to the partial equilibrium effect of current markups.
Of course, both mechanisms are complementary, particularly if current markups serve to
form expectations about future markups. This subsection explores if different proxies of
current market power are consistent with our model, complementing the existing litera-
ture on the topic.
Given the difficulty to obtain good proxies for the degree of aggregate market power in
different countries, we split this subsection in two parts. In Section 6.2.1 we focus on the
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specific case of the U.S. by exploiting industry-level variations. Section 6.2.2 expands the
analysis at the cross-country level by creating country-specific markups.
6.2.1 The U.S. Industry Concentration Rate
U.S. industry-level data is gathered from three different datasets. Tobin’s Q data comes
from the Worldscope database, the capital-output ratio is obtained from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry database by dividing the total real capital stock over the real
value of the shipments, and the degree of market power is proxied by four different mea-
sures of industry concentration obtained from the U.S. Economic Census for the years
2002, 2007, and 2012.49
Merging the three databases requires various steps. Tobin’s Q firm-level data is aggre-
gated at the 4-digit SIC industry level by calculating the median Q of the industry for
the years 2002, 2007, and 2012. Data on industry concentration is classified following the
NAICS industry classification applied by the U.S. Economic Census. In order to homog-
enize both samples we transform the NAICS code into SIC codes. More specifically, we
first constraint our analysis to industries (6-digit NAICS) that are consistently defined
among the 3 census waves used. Similar to Barkai (2017), we further homogenize the
NAICS codes to the 1997 year definition using the concordances provided by the census.
In order to assign 6-digit NAICS industry codes to 4-digit SIC industry classification,
we use the crosswalk file provided by David Dorn, where the transformation is based on
the employment weights of NAICS on SIC industries.50 The NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry database provides data already disaggregated at 4-digit SIC industry classifica-
tion.51
Our study of the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the market power includes a max-
imum of 480 4-digit industries covering 6 large sectors of the economy (Manufacturing,
Utilities, Retail Trade, Wholesale Trade, Finance, and Services). Due to the nature of
the NBER-CES database, our study is limited to a maximum of 280 4-digit industries
within the manufacturing sector where the capital-output ratio is included. Empirically,
we estimate:
∆ ln (Xit) = α0 + α1∆ ln (ConYit) + it, (30)
where ∆ ln (Xit) represents the 5 year log differences of Tobin’s Q or the capital-output
49Following Autor et al. (2017) and Barkai (2017) we consider the share of sales of the 4, 8, 20 and 50
largest companies in an industry.
50The crosswalk file is available at http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm.
51The NBER-CES database covers 459 4-digit SIC industries for the period 1958-2011. We match
2011 capital-output values with the 2012 values of Tobin’s Q and industry concentration.
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ratio, ∆ ln (ConYit) is the 5 year log differences of the share of sales for the 4, 8, 20 and
50 largest companies in the industry, and it is the classical error term. Subscripts i and
t represent, respectively, the cross-section (4-digit SIC industries) and time dimension of
the panel.
Table 6 presents the estimates of equation (30) for the four different measures of industry
concentration. Columns [1]-[8] display results when the dependent variable is the 5 year
log differences of Tobin’s Q (∆q). Results for the specification using the 5 year log
differences of the capital-output ratio (∆ky) are showed in columns [9]-[12].52
Table 6: Tobin’s Q, Capital-Output Ratio and Industry Concentration
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Dependent variable: ∆q Dependent variable: ∆ky
∆Con4 0.066 0.087 -0.153
(0.078) (0.083) (0.068)**
∆Con8 0.088 0.120 -0.172
(0.109) (0.118) (0.087)*
∆Con20 0.271 0.332 -0.160
(0.126)** (0.134)** (0.097)
∆Con50 0.340 0.413 -0.099
(0.157)** (0.174)** (0.094)
Constant 0.28 0.28 0.278 0.28 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.317 -0.079 -0.082 -0.083 -0.083
(0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25
Observations 834 833 832 825 834 833 832 825 467 467 465 458
SIC4 480 480 480 473 480 480 480 473 280 280 280 273
SIC2 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 20 20 20 20
Sectors 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 1
Sector FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
SIC2 FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. SIC4 and SIC2 indicate the number of groups included in the regressions classified at the 4 and 2-digit SIC level. Sectors
indicates the number of groups included using the broader sector definition.
A positive relationship between industry concentration and Tobin’s Q emerges in all the
regressions.53 When industry concentration is proxied by the share of sales of the 20 and
50 largest companies in the industry we find a positive and significant impact implying
that a 1 percentage point raise in industry concentration growth rate is associated with
52Columns [1]-[4] include fixed effects for the 6 sectors, and columns [5]-[8] include fixed effects for
59 different 2-digit SIC industries. Given that the capital-output ratio is limited to the manufacturing
sector, we only included 2-digit SIC industries fixed effects. All regressions control for time fixed effects
and the standard errors are clustered at 2-digit SIC industry level. Results are also robust to the inclusion
of 3-digit SIC level fixed effects and alternative choices of the level at which errors are clustered. These
results are available upon request. For simplicity, in Table 6 ∆ConY represents the 5 year log differences
of the share of sales.
53David Autor and coauthors briefly comment the relationship of Tobin’s Q with monopoly power
(Autor et al., 2017, p.20). In the context of their Superstar firm theory they also argue that a positive
relationship should exist. They show that an increase in the industry concentration rate of the largest 20
companies in the industry (Con20) it is related to an increase of Tobin’s Q of 0.411 (Autor et al., 2017,
footnote 32). In the same footnote, using Tobin’s Q as a proxy of market power, Autor et al. (2017)
also relate the labor share with the Q. The coefficient they find (-0.085) for the U.S. is similar to our
estimations.
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an increase in Tobin’s Q growth rate of between 0.27 and 0.41 pp. This result is robust
to the inclusion of fixed effects at the sector level and at 2-digit SIC level. However,
when the industry concentration is proxied by the share of the sales of the 4 and 8 largest
companies in the industry, although the impact is positive, its magnitude is small and
not significantly different from zero at the standard levels. One possible explanation for
this disparity has to due with the way we defined Tobin’s Q, that is, based on the median
company within each 4-digit SIC industry level. While this measure allows us to control
for potential outliers, on the other hand it implies that changes in Q are not driven by
companies at the top of the distribution, which are likely to be also the ones at the top
of the sales distribution.54
As predicted by our model, columns [9]-[12] report a negative relationship between the
growth rate of the capital-output ratio and the growth rate of the market concentration.
In this case, the coefficient is more precisely estimated when the industry market power is
proxied by the share of sales of the 4 and 8 largest companies. More specifically, we find
that an increase of 1 pp. in the industry concentration is associated with a capital-output
ratio growth decline of around 0.16 pp.
In order to asses the validity of our model, we follow the same strategy of Section 6.1 for the
dividend income tax. Figure 8 presents the correlations between our variables of interest
and the share of sales of the largest 20 companies in the industry by displaying the α1
coefficients (in pp.) of equation (30). Separate regressions are estimated for the different
2-digit SIC manufacturing industries included in our sample. Although the estimates are
not precise, Figure 8.a suggests that most of the industries present the expected positive
correlation between Q and the proxy of market power. On the other hand, Figure 8.b
shows the corresponding results with respect to the industry concentration indicator and
the capital-output ratio. Consistent with the results of Table 6, most industries display a
negative correlation between these two variables.55
54In order to check this possibility, we rerun regressions [1]-[8] when Tobin’s Q is calculated as the
industry average. Although under some assumptions (i.e. minimum number of companies in the industry,
cap the Q at different values...) the concentration indicator for the 4 and 8 largest companies become
more relevant, it remains nonsignificant in a non-negligible number of cases.
55Our sample includes industries containing at least 5 observations. On average we have 26 observa-
tions per 2-digit SIC industry when the dependent variable is ∆q, and 25 for ∆ky.
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Figure 8: Tobins’ Q, Capital-Output Ratios and Industry Concentration (I)
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Notes: Own calculations obtained from ∆ ln (Xit) = α0 + α1∆ ln (ConYit) + it,, where X represents Tobin’s Q and the capital-
output ratio, Con20 is the share of sales of the 20 largest companies in the industry, and  is a classic disturbance term. The
vertical axis shows the coefficient α1 in pp. Dark bars indicate that α1 is significant at 5% level. Each graph shows SIC 2 industries
for which we have at least 5 observations.
Figure 9 further exploits the 2-digit cross-industry variation by presenting a scatter plot
where the vertical axis displays the coefficients of a regression of Tobin’s Q on the industry
concentration rate, and the horizontal axis displays the coefficients of a regression of the
capital-output ratio on the industry concentration rate.56 Altogether, we find evidence
supporting the market power mechanism highlighted in our model. More specifically,
Figure 9 shows a negative relationship, which indicates that industries where Tobin’s
Q raises the most when the industry concentration rate increases are those where the
capital-output decreases the most in response to that change in market concentration.
56As in the tax exercise, these coefficients are slightly different than the ones presented in Figure 8.
The source of discrepancy is that this time both equations are constrained to include the same sample.
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Figure 9: Tobins’ Q, Capital-Output Ratios and Industry Concentration (II)
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Notes: Own calculations obtained from ∆ ln (Xit) = α0 + α1∆ ln (Con20it) + it, where
X represents Tobin’s Q and the capital-output ratio in the vertical and the horizontal axis
respectively. Con20 is the share of sales of the 20 largest companies in the industry, and
 is a classic disturbance term. Both axis show the coefficient α1 in pp. Both equations
are constrained to have the same number of observations. The scatter plot is obtained after
excluding outliers. An outlier is defined as an observation with a weight of 0 after using the
rreg command in STATA. Correlation coefficient= −0.38.
6.2.2 International Markups
To show cross-country evidence between our variables of interest and the level of market
power, we calculate international markups. We follow Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
closely.57 The markup µ is defined as:
µ =
1
1− SΠ =
1
SL + SK
, (31)
where SΠ, SL, and SK are respectively the profit, labor, and capital shares. While the
labor share is obtained straightforward, the capital share is defined as (see equation (20)
in Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014):
SK =
RK
Y
=
(
ξX
Y
)( 1
β
− 1 + δ
δ
)
, (32)
where R is the capital rental rate, K is the stock of capital, and Y is the gross domestic
product. The first term in the right hand side is composed by the product of the relative
price of investment (ξ) and the gross capital formation (X). Empirically this term is prox-
57 See also Rotemberg and Woodford (1993); Basu and Fernald (2002); Fernald and Neiman (2011)
for a similar strategy.
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ied by the nominal investment rate. The second right hand side term is a combination
of a discount factor (β) and the depreciation rate (δ). For the sake of simplicity, as in
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), these factors are assumed to be common across time
and countries.58 All the data needed to compute µ is obtained from national accounts.
Given that Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) reasoning is based on the transition be-
tween steady states, this part of the analysis focuses on the long-run impact of µ on our
variables of interest (q, ky, and lis) by estimating an ECM using different Pesaran-type
estimators. Given data availability, the sample period covers 1980-2014 when q and ky
are the dependent variables, and 1980-2009 for the lis.
Table 7: Markups: International Comparison
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
2FE MG CMG CMGt 2FE MG CMG CMGt 2FE MG CMG CMGt
Dependent variable: ∆q Dependent variable: ∆ky Dependent variable: ∆lis
Xt−1 -0.293 -0.55 -0.558 -0.627 -0.031 -0.162 -0.086 -0.254 -0.206 -0.414 -0.351 -0.444
(0.059)*** (0.049)*** (0.069)*** (0.070)*** (0.014)** (0.034)*** (0.037)** (0.040)*** (0.046)*** (0.044)*** (0.054)*** (0.067)***
markupt−1 0.117 0.526 0.426 0.505 -0.066 -0.084 -0.112 -0.051 -0.133 -0.227 -0.229 -0.268
(0.052)** (0.135)*** (0.203)** (0.238)** (0.033)* (0.040)** (0.027)*** (0.030)* (0.050)** (0.045)*** (0.034)*** (0.056)***
∆markupt 0.021 -0.094 0.005 0.088 0.158 0.363 0.175 0.15 -0.168 -0.015 -0.133 -0.139
(0.106) (0.222) (0.229) (0.272) (0.045)*** (0.042)*** (0.028)*** (0.031)*** (0.070)** (0.061) (0.069)* (0.071)*
t -0.001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant -0.147 -0.431 -0.215 -0.118 0.106 0.265 0.047 0.119 0.003 -0.037 0.004 -0.149
(0.047)*** (0.167)*** (0.277) (0.431) (0.030)*** (0.043)*** (0.034) (0.044)*** (0.028) (0.053) (0.033) (0.086)*
Number of id 31 31 31 31 25 25 25 25 17 17 17 17
Observations 710 710 710 710 572 572 572 572 404 404 404 404
R-squared 0.43 0.61 0.4
RMSE 0.1029 0.0982 0.0706 0.0652 0.0137 0.013 0.0082 0.0074 0.02 0.0173 0.0137 0.013
lr-markup 0.4009 0.9562 0.7644 0.8051 -2.099 -0.5162 -1.2963 -0.2011 -0.6487 -0.5494 -0.6526 -0.6039
se-markup 0.1838 0.2591 0.3751 0.3905 1.6899 0.268 0.6427 0.1216 0.1444 0.1231 0.1399 0.1562
Trend 0.29 0.1 0.32 0.36 0.12 0.29
CD test -2.3471 28.0625 -0.4653 -0.9004 -2.5823 14.3125 -2.1381 -0.7576 -3.0758 3.6063 -1.5579 -1.6566
Abs Corr 0.2702 0.3476 0.238 0.2365 0.2708 0.2774 0.217 0.2357 0.2116 0.1994 0.2286 0.236
Int I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2FE = 2-way Fixed Effects, MG = Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group (with country-specific linear trends), CMG = Pesaran
(2006) CCE Mean Group, CMGt = CMG with country-specific linear trends.
CD-test reports the Pesaran (2004) test statistics, under the null of cross-section independence of the residuals. Int indicates
the order of integration of the residuals (I(0) - stationary, I(1) - nonstationary) obtained from Pesaran (2007) CIPS test. RMSE
presents the root mean squared error. Trend show the share of countries where the linear trend is significant at 5%. lr-markup
and se-markup represent respectively markup’s long-run impact and its standard error. Xt−1 is the lagged level of the dependent
variable.
Table 7 present the results. Columns [1]-[4] show a clear positive and significant impact
of our markup proxy on Tobin’s Q. As expected, columns [5]-[9] present a negative rela-
tionship between market power and the capital-output ratio. Finally, similarly to Barkai
(2017) and Autor et al. (2017) for the U.S., we find a negative impact of markups on
the labor share. In particular, for our preferred estimator (column [12]), we get that a 1
percentage point increase in the markup decreases the labor share by 0.6%.
58β is defined to be β = 11+0.1 and δ = 0.10.
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6.3 Corporate Governance
The last factor under analysis is corporate governance (GOV ). Improvements in cor-
porate governance may increase shareholder control or change incentives towards more
shareholder-oriented goals. In our model, these improvements would make γ and m(γ, r)
closer to one, rising Q and reducing physical investment and the labor share. Empirically,
we proxy the level of corporate governance regime by using the Corporate Governance
Pillar (CGVSCORE) Index obtained from the Asset4 ESG Database provided by Datas-
tream. This index measures corporate governance practices in terms of to what extent
board members and executives act in the best interest of shareholders.59 This database
provides yearly firm-level data for the period 2002-2014.
We split this section in two parts. First, we study the relation between Q, the capital-
output ratio and the corporate governance index at the aggregate (country) level. Sec-
ondly, we focus on the U.S. and exploit the firm-level dimension of our data using different
proxies for investment.
6.3.1 Aggregate Analysis
In order to obtain country-level data of Tobin’s Q and corporate governance, we follow
the same strategy explained in Section 3 for Tobin’s Q. That is, firm-level data is first
clustered in 17 different industries using the Fama-French classification, where we compute
the industry median of our variables of interest.60 Country data is aggregated as the
market value weighted average of the median industries.61
59To be precise, CGVSCORE defines corporate governance in the following way: “The corporate
governance pillar measures a company’s systems and processes, which ensure that its board members
and executives act in the best interests of its long term shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity,
through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through
the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate long term shareholder
value”.
60We constrain the sample to include only firms for which we have data on both Tobin’s Q and the
corporate governance index.
61As before, in order to be safe about potential outliers we just include sector-year pairs where we
have data for at least three companies.
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Figure 10: Tobin’s Q, Capital-Output ratio and Corporate Governance (I)
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(b) Capital-Output ratio
Given the shorter time dimension available, we exploit the cross-section variation across
countries to study the relationship between Q, the capital-output ratio and our corporate
governance variable. More specifically, Figure 10.a and 10.b present the relation between
the corporate governance index, and Tobin’s Q and the capital-output ratio, respectively.
The first noticeable result is the existence of country heterogeneity regarding the value
of corporate governance. Among the countries with the smallest value we find Japan,
Greece, Austria and Poland, all of them with values of the corporate governance index
around 20%. On the other extreme, Anglo-Saxon countries (U.S., U.K. and Canada)
appear to be the ones that are more “shareholder oriented”, with corporate governance
index values of around 80%. This is consistent with the evidence and analysis provided
by the traditional comparative political economy literature.
Figure 10 presents two important facts: (i) there is positive relationship between cor-
porate governance and Tobin’s Q (Figure 10.a), and (ii) there is a negative relationship
between corporate governance and the capital-output ratio (Figure 10.b). In other words,
Figure 10 is consistent with our model, which rationalizes that economies where compa-
nies’ goals are more shareholder oriented present a larger Q and a smaller capital-output
ratio. Figure 10.a is also consistent with Piketty and Zucman (2014)’s interpretation for
high Tobin’s Q in Anglo-Saxon countries, which they relate to the higher degree of share-
holders’ rights protection.
Figure 11 shows the cross-country variation by presenting a scatter plot where the vertical
(horizontal) axis displays the coefficients α1 from the country-specific equation ln (Xt) =
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Figure 11: Tobin’s Q, Capital-Output ratio and Corporate Governance (II)
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Notes: Own calculations obtained from ln (Xt) = α0 + α1GOVt + t, where X represents
Tobin’s Q and the capital-output ratio in the vertical and the horizontal axis respectively.
GOV is the corporate governance index, and  is a classic disturbance term. Both axis
show the coefficient α1 in %. Both equations are constrained to have the same number of
observations. Each regression only includes countries which have at least 10 observations
for the period 2002-2014. The scatter plot is obtained after excluding outliers. An outlier
is defined as an observation with a weight of 0 after using the rreg command in STATA.
Correlation coefficient= −0.38∗.
α0 + α1GOVt + t, where X represents, depending on the specification, Q or KY , and
GOV is the corporate governance index. We observe a negative relationship between the
impact of corporate governance on Tobin’s Q and its impact on the capital-output ratio.62
6.3.2 Firm-level Analysis
This section uses U.S. firm-level data on investment. Our investment variable is firm’s
capital expenditure over the firm net property, plant and equipment, obtained from World-
scope, as in Gompers et al. (2003) and Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016). Tobin’s Q and
corporate governance data come again from Worldscope and Asset4 ESG database, re-
spectively. We restrict our sample to include only firm-year pairs with available data on
our three variables of interest. Like in Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016), we capped Q at
10. Finally, we have 14,434 yearly observations on 1772 U.S. publicly listed companies.
62It is worthy to note that this data has some peculiar characteristics. Contrary to our hypothesis
and the cross-country analysis, Figure B5 in Appendix B shows that most of the countries has a negative
within-country correlation between the Q and the corporate governance index, and a positive relation
between the latter and the capital-output ratio. Figure B6 limits the analysis to the period 2002-2007
and proves that this odd result is due to the inclusion of the Great Recession period in a relatively small
sample. Figure B7 replicates Figure 11 when just the period 2002-2007 is considered, showing that the
negative relationship between the coefficients is still present.
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Figure 12 shows a descriptive picture of our data by displaying the fractional polynomial
regression line between our variables of interest (Tobin’s Q and investment (INV )) and
the corporate governance index, along with the 95% confidence intervals. The vertical
line represents the median value of the corporate governance index (73.36). As expected,
Tobin’s Q increases with corporate governance. The pattern followed by investment is
less expected. We observe that larger values of corporate governance are indeed related
to lower investment levels, but this negative relationship holds primarily (and strongly)
for values of the corporate governance index above 60%.
Figure 12: Tobin’s Q, Investment and Corporate Governance (I)
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Notes: Fractional polynomial regression line (along with the 95% confidence intervals). The
vertical line represents the median value for corporate governance (73.36). The sample
consists of 14,434 observations for 1772 publicly listed U.S. companies during the period
2002-2014.
Despite this evidence, a deeper econometric exercise is convenient. We follow Gompers
et al. (2003) and regress Q and investment on the lagged corporate governance proxy. We
also include different dummies to control for potential unobservable factors (µit):
ln (Qit) =α0 + α1GOVit−1 + µit + it
INVit =β0 + β1GOVit−1 + µit + εit,
(33)
Table 8 shows the results. Tobin’s Q (Investment) regressions are presented in Panel A
(Panel B). Each column includes different fixed effects. Column [1] includes 2-digit SIC
fixed effects. Column [2] further controls by year fixed effects. Columns [3]-[4] show the
interaction effects of 2 and 3-digit SIC industries, respectively, with year dummies. Col-
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Table 8: Tobin’s Q, Investment and Corporate Governance
Panel A [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Dependent variable: q
GOVt−1 0.170 0.178 0.187 0.160 0.083 0.151 0.112
(0.044)*** (0.047)*** (0.048)*** (0.051)*** (0.036)** (0.045)*** (0.040)***
Constant 0.350 0.446 0.340 0.358 0.409 0.377 0.446
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.024)*** (0.031)*** (0.026)***
R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.48 0.42 0.44 0.5
Panel B [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Dependent variable: INV
GOVt−1 -0.042 -0.044 -0.046 -0.039 -0.044 -0.043 -0.050
(0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.019)***
Constant 0.242 0.218 0.245 0.241 0.244 0.245 0.261
(0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)***
R-squared 0.09 0.1 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.22
Observations 12574 12574 12574 12574 12574 12574 12574
Firms 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
SIC4 365 365 365 365 365 365 365
SIC3 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
SIC2 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
SIC2 FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
SIC3 FE NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
SIC4 FE NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Time FE NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
SIC2*Time NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
SIC3*Time NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. SIC4, SIC3 and SIC2 indicate the number of groups included in the regressions classified at the 4, 3 and 2-digit SIC level.
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umn [5] include 4-digit SIC fixed effects, and columns [6]-[7] control for the interaction
between 2-digit SIC industries and year dummies along with 3 and 4-digit SIC industries
fixed effects.
Our results are robust across specifications and show a positive relation between gover-
nance and Tobin’s Q, and a negative relation between investment and governance. More
specifically, an increase in the governance index of 1 percentage point is associated with
an increase in Tobin’s Q between 0.08% and 0.19%. Regarding investment, we find that
a rise of 1 percentage point in the governance index is related to an investment decrease
of around 0.05 percentage points.
To conclude, we further exploit our data by analyzing the cross-industry variation for the
U.S. More specifically, Figure 13 shows the relation between our variables of interest and
the governance index for the 17 Fama-French industry classification. Once again we see
that industries where its board members and executives are more aligned with the interest
of its shareholders present a higher Q and lower investment.63
Figure 13: Tobin’s Q, Investment and Corporate Governance (II)
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All in all, we find supporting evidence for the three determinants of Q proposed in this
paper. However, it is important to keep in mind that this section is not claiming any
causal relation, and that further analysis would be needed in order to assess the relevance
of the different channels that affect Tobin’s Q and asset prices. The key result of the paper
63Under the use of the firm-level investment proxy, we do not find that firms where the Q is more
sensitive to changes in corporate governance are also the ones where the investment declines the most
in response to changes in GOV . This could be due to the difficulties to control for other firm relevant
factors.
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(i.e. the long-run negative impact of asset prices on the labor share through a slowdown
of investment), however, might be valid for other driving forces behind Q.
7 Conclusions
The secular decline of the global labor share has received vivid attention in the last years.
We contribute to this recent literature by proposing a new mechanism that links the evo-
lution of the labor share with the evolution of financial wealth, physical capital stock, and
equity Tobins Q.
In our model, an increase in equity Tobins Q boosts financial wealth pushing investors
to demand a higher return on equity. Firms respond by reducing investment and, con-
sequently, the capital-output ratio. This raises equity returns but drives the labor share
down when capital and labor are complements. Therefore, our paper propose a theory
that reconciles the decline of the labor share with values of the elasticity of substitution
below 1.
We test our model estimating different mean group estimators based on a common factor
model. Our results suggest that the global increase of Tobin’s Q since 1980 is associated
to the decline of the labor share and explains between 41% and 57%, depending on the
estimator, of such decline. When the relative price of investment is included in our esti-
mations, we find that it does not have any significant effect on the labor income share.
Our results show that the endogenous negative relationship between asset prices and
corporate capital, embodied in the equity Tobin’s Q ratio, is crucial to understand the
dynamics of the capital-output ratio and the labor share. We also find evidence suggest-
ing that the global rise of asset prices might be related to widespread changes in dividend
taxation, expected market power rents and changes in corporate governance.
In light of our findings, we believe that the decline of the labor income share might not
be primarily the irreversible consequence of technological drivers, like those associated to
capital-deepening factors, but the result of policies and institutional designs that boost
asset prices at the expense of investment.
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APPENDIX A. Tobin’s Q derivation
Proposition 2. In symmetric equilibrium, steady state Tobin’s Q is
Q(r) = (1− τ)
(
1− γ + r
γr
+
F (k(r), l)
ξrk(r)
)
(A1)
Proof. For Tobin’s Q derivation, we follow Brun and Gonzalez (2017) closely. Firm i
solves
V (ki) = max
k′i, li
{
divi(1− τ)
p
+ γ
V (k′i)
1 + r′
}
(A2)
subject to piF (ki, li) = wili + divi + p(k
′
i − (1 − δ)ki) and yiy =
(
pi
p
)−ξ
. The first order
condition with respect to k′i is:
p′k′i
(1 + r′)
γ
=
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
p′iFk (k
′
i, l
′
i) k
′
i + p
′ (1− δ) k′i (A3)
Since we have constant returns to scale, the production function satisfies
F (k, l) = Fk(k, l)k + Fl(k, l)l
Plugging in the first order condition with respect to labor, wi =
(
ξ−1
ξ
)
piFl(ki, li), we get:
Fk(ki, li)ki = F (ki, li)− Fl(ki, li)li = F (ki, li)−
(
ξ
ξ − 1
)
w
pi
li
Multiplying both sides by
(
ξ−1
ξ
)
pi, we get:(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
piFk(ki, li)ki = piF (ki, li)− wli − 1
ξ
piF (ki, li),
Using the flow and funds constraint of the firm, we get:(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
p′iFk(k
′
i, l
′
i)k
′
i = div
′
i + p
′(k′′i − (1− δ)k′i)−
1
ξ
p′iF (k
′
i, l
′
i),
Using this expression, we can rewrite A3 as:
p′k′i
(1 + r′)
γ
= div′i + p
′k′′i −
1
ξ
p′iF (k
′
i, l
′
i)
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or just:
k′i = γ
(
div′i
p′ (1 + r′)
− 1
ξ
p′iF (k
′
i, l
′
i
p′ (1 + r′)
+
k′′i
(1 + r′)
)
)
(A4)
Using forward substitution and the transversality condition, we get:
kit+1 =
∞∑
j=1
 γjj∏
l=1
(1 + rt+l)
divit+j
pt+j
− γ
j
ξ
pit+j
pt+j
F (kit+j, lit+j)
j∏
l=1
(1 + rt+l)
 (A5)
Note that equity returns are given by:
1 + r′i =
div′i(1− τ) + v′i
vi
p
p′
(A6)
Using forward substitution and the transversality condition, we get the standard equity
price expression:
vit
pt
= (1− τ)
∞∑
j=1
1
j∏
l=1
(1 + rt+l)
divit+j
pt+j
(A7)
Tobin’s Q is the ratio vit
ptkit+1
. Using A5 and A7:
Qt = (1− τ)
1 + 1ξ 1kit+1
∞∑
j=1
pit+jF (kit+j, lit+j)γ
j
pt+j
j∏
l=1
(1 + rt+l)
+
1
kit+1
∞∑
j=1
divit+j (1− γj)
pt+j
j∏
l=1
(1 + rt+l)
 (A8)
In symmetric equilibrium, all firms produce the same output, own the same capital, have
the same equity value and, therefore, have the same Tobin’s Q. At the steady state, this
equation becomes:
Q(r) = (1− τ)
(
1− γ + r
γr
+
F (k(r), l)
ξrk(r)
)
(A9)
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APPENDIX B: Supplementary tables and figures
Table B1: Selected Economies and Sample Period
# Country Sample period # Country Sample period
1 Australia** 1980-2008 22 Luxembourg* 1991-2008
2 Austria** 1980-2008 23 Mexico** 1988-2008
3 Belgium** 1980-2008 24 Morocco 1998-2007
4 Brazil* 1992-2008 25 Netherlands** 1980-2008
5 Canada** 1980-2008 26 New Zealand** 1986-2008
6 Chile* 1990-2008 27 Norway** 1980-2007
7 China 1995-2007 28 Peru 1992-2003
8 Colombia 1993-2007 29 Philippines** 1988-2008
9 Denmark** 1980-2009 30 Poland 1995-2008
10 Finland** 1987-2009 31 Portugal** 1988-2009
11 France** 1980-2009 32 South Africa** 1980-2008
12 Germany** 1983-2008 33 Spain** 1986-2008
13 Greece** 1988-2009 34 Sri Lanka 1994-2008
14 Hong Kong** 1980-2003 35 Sweden** 1982-2009
15 Hungary 1995-2008 36 Switzerland** 1980-2007
16 India* 1991-2008 37 Thailand 1988-2003
17 Ireland** 1981-2008 38 Turkey 1990-2003
18 Israel 1993, 1995-2008 39 UK** 1980-2008
19 Italy** 1980-2008 40 US** 1980-2008
20 Japan** 1980-2007 41 Venezuela 1992-2006
21 Korea** 1980-2003
Notes: Countries with at least one asterisk indicate they are used in the regressions presented in columns [1]-[5] of Table 4.
Countries with two asterisks indicate they are used in the regression presented in column [7] of Table 4.
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Table B2: Fama-French 17 Industries Classification
# Sector # Sector
1 Food 9 Steel
2 Mining 10 Fabricated Products
3 Oil 11 Machinery
4 Textiles & Apparel 12 Automobiles
5 Consumer Durables 13 Transportation
6 Chemicals 14 Utilities
7 Consumables 15 Retail
8 Construction 16 Financials
17 Other
Table B3: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Raw variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LIS 915 0.468 0.096 0.214 0.636
Q 915 1.241 0.268 0.519 3.229
RP 915 1.041 0.097 0.767 1.413
Panel B: Regression variables (in logs)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lis 915 -0.785 0.234 -1.543 -0.452
q 915 0.195 0.200 -0.655 1.172
rp 915 0.036 0.092 -0.265 0.346
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Table B7: ECM with Relative Prices: Robustness
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2FE CCEP MG CMG CMGt CMGt1 CMGt2
list−1 -0.136 -0.192 -0.461 -0.442 -0.579 -0.714 -0.958
(0.047)*** (0.068)*** (0.111)*** (0.112)*** (0.155)*** (0.181)*** (0.337)***
qt−1 -0.001 -0.003 -0.039 -0.001 -0.05 -0.066 -0.135
(0.009) (0.012) (0.036) (0.007) (0.029)* (0.038)* (0.078)*
rpt−1 0.043 0.075 0.151 0.108 -0.019 -0.044 0.296
(0.032) (0.055) (0.108) (0.093) (0.054) (0.124) (0.461)
∆q -0.039 -0.052 -0.061 -0.043 -0.042 -0.049 -0.091
(0.018)** (0.022)** (0.039) (0.018)** (0.010)*** (0.020)** (0.036)**
∆rp 0.088 0.078 -0.062 0.038 0.02 0.158 0.094
(0.076) (0.080) (0.104) (0.077) (0.075) (0.054)*** (0.297)
t 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.066 -0.349 0.048 0.143 0.273 0.181
(0.034)* (0.082)*** (0.129) (0.130) (0.179) (0.253)
Number of id 9 9 9 7 7 7 6
Observations 199 199 199 175 175 171 149
R-squared 0.51 0.75
RMSE 0.0124 0.0098 0.0106 0.0067 0.0061 0.0051 0.0039
Trend 0.22 0.43 0.14 0
lr-q -0.0052 -0.0164 -0.0847 -0.0011 -0.0863 -0.0919 -0.1404
se-q 0.065 0.0599 0.0799 0.0149 0.0556 0.0576 0.0949
lr-rp 0.3149 0.3911 0.3266 0.2434 -0.0324 -0.062 0.3092
se-rp 0.2716 0.3177 0.247 0.2199 0.0938 0.1747 0.4931
CD test -3.8732 -2.7485 3.7987 -2.0474 -2.347 -2.4567 -1.9305
Abs Corr 0.2378 0.2169 0.3325 0.2104 0.2141 0.2757 0.2229
Int I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2FE = 2-way Fixed Effects, CCEP = Pooled Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects (CCE), MG = Pesaran and Smith (1995)
Mean Group (with country trends), CMG = Pesaran (2006) CCE Mean Group, CMGt = CMG with country-specific linear trends,
CMGt1 and CMGt2 = CMGt with, respectively, one and two extra cross-sectional averages lags, as indicated by Chudik and
Pesaran (2015).
CD-test reports the Pesaran (2004) test statistics, under the null of cross-section independence of the residuals. Int indicates
the order of integration of the residuals (I(0) - stationary, I(1) - nonstationary) obtained from Pesaran (2007) CIPS test. RMSE
presents the root mean squared error. Trend show the share of countries where the linear trend is significant at 5%. lr-q and se-q
represent respectively q’s long-run impact and its standard error. lr-rp and se-rp represent respectively rp’s long-run impact and
its standard error.
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Figure B2: Tobin’s Q against Relative Prices
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Notes: Own calculation based on a (outlier-robust) sample of 41 countries and 913 observa-
tions. Variables are demeaned to control for fixed effects. Correlation coefficient= −0.11∗∗∗.
Figure B3: Labor Income Share against Relative Prices
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Notes: Own calculation based on a (outlier-robust) sample of 41 countries and 911 observa-
tions. Variables are demeaned to control for fixed effects. Correlation coefficient= 0.10∗∗∗.
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Figure B4: Country-specific Trends: Unrestricted Sample
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(c) Capital-Output ratio
Notes: Own calculations obtained from Xt = α0 +α1t+ t, where X represents our variables of interest (Q and the capital-output
ratio in logs), t is a linear trend, and epsilon is a classic disturbance term. The vertical axis show α1 in %. Dark bars indicate that
α1 is significant at 5% level. Each regression only includes countries which have at least 10 observations for the period 1980-2014.
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Figure B7: Tobin’s Q, Capital-Output ratios and Corporate Governance (2002-2007) II
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Notes: Own calculations obtained from ln (Xt) = α0 + α1GOVt + t, where X represents
Tobin’s Q and the capital-output ratio in the vertical and the horizontal axis respectively.
GOV is the corporate governance index, and  is a classic disturbance term. Both axis
show the coefficient α1 in %. Both equations are constrained to have the same number of
observations. Each regression includes countries which have at least 2 observations for the
period 2002-2007. The scatter plot is obtained after excluding outliers. An outlier is defined
as an observation with a weight of 0 after using the rreg command in STATA. Correlation
coefficient= −0.22.
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APPENDIX C: Intangible Assets
The rise of intangible assets has become an important topic. Given the rise of intangibles
since the mid 90s (Figure C1), many scholars have analyzed their potential implications
on different economic aspects (see among others, Koh et al., 2016, Gutie´rrez and Philip-
pon, 2016, Peters and Taylor, 2017, Alexander and Eberly, 2018).
Figure C1 shows our own calculation of the U.S. ratio of intangible assets over total as-
sets (ipp). This share is directly obtained from the Worldscope database at the firm level.
Country-level data is obtained as the firm market value weighted average.64 We present
both the ratio of intangible over total assets (solid line) and intangibles excluding good-
will to assets (dashed-dot line). The last measure is usually considered more informative
about the state of intangible capital as most of the goodwill is account for M&A and not
formation of intangible capital.
Although both series are increasing, their trends and magnitudes differ significantly. For
the total ipp ratio, the share has almost double between 1990 and 2008 evolving from a
value of 10% to 19% with a positive trend starting in the mid-’90s. Regarding the mea-
sure that excludes goodwill, both the magnitude and the trend are less pronounced. The
share increased from 2.5% in 1990 to 6.5% in 2008 with the main changed in the trend
happening at the beginning of the new century.
Figure C1: U.S. Intangible Assets Intensity (1990-2008)
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Notes: Market value weighted average from a sample of 9,727 publicly listed U.S. companies.
The ipp rise is relevant in our study because it can artificially increase Tobin’s Q due to
a problem of measurement. In particular, given that intangible assets are more difficult
64For sake of comparison total assets are defined in the same way as Tobin’s Q denominator (i.e.
excluding preferred stocks). Tobin’s Q is capped at 10.
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to measure than traditional capital, its recent increase can provoke an underestimation
of the firm’s stock of capital, and therefore, an overestimation of firm’s Q.
Given that our main analysis exploits within-country variation, we need to check if the
rise of ipp is related with an overestimation of our empirical measure of Q. In order to
do so, Figure C2 presents the year dummies coefficients from a market value weighted
regression including 4-digit SIC level fixed effects. The difference between the solid and
dashed-dot line is that the latter further includes the ipp share (without goodwill) as a
regressor. If our measure of Tobin’s Q was biased due to the rise of ipp, we would expect
a lower Q after 2000 when we are controlling for the share of intangible assets (dashed-dot
line). However, along the period under analysis, we do not observe a significant difference
between the two series. These results allow us to conclude that intangible assets do not
significantly bias our Q (within-variation) channel.
Figure C2: Tobin’s Q with and without IPP)
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Notes: Own calculations obtained as year fixed effects from a market value weighted regres-
sion including country including 4-digit SIC level fixed effects. The difference between the
solid and dashed-dot line is that the latter further includes the ipp share (without goodwill)
as a regressor (Sample includes 9,727 U.S. publicly listed firms).
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APPENDIX D: Technical Appendix
Time-Series Properties
The order of integration and potential cross-section dependence in the data play a central
role in panel time-series. In order to deal with potential problems, Tables D1 and D2
analyze, respectively, the order of integration and the cross-section dependence of the
variables used in our analysis.
Regarding the order of integration, Table D1 presents the results for two specifications of
the cross-sectional augmented panel unit root (CIPS) Pesaran (2007) test. In particular,
panel D1.a) shows the results when a constant is included in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) regressions, while D1.b) further includes a deterministic trend.
Pesaran (2007) CIPS test belongs to a 2nd generation of panel unit root tests, which are
characterized by allowing potential cross-section dependence of the variables. Similar to
Im et al. (2003), Pesaran (2007) CIPS test proposes a standardized average of individual
ADF coefficients, where the ADF processes have been augmented by the cross-sectional
averages to control for the unobservable component.
Table D1 presents the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test values along with their corresponding
p− value for our three variable of interest. “Lags” indicates the lag augmentation in the
Dickey-Fuller regression. Given that the null of nonstationarity is only rejected in 4 out
of 30 cases, we can safely assert that the variables under analysis are nonstationary.
Table D1: Unit Root Tests
a) Pesaran (2007) CIPS test: Constant
Lags lis (p) q (p) rp (p)
0 0.431 0.667 -2.744 0.003 -0.118 0.453
1 -0.207 0.418 -2.405 0.008 -0.141 0.444
2 -1.199 0.115 0.103 0.541 0.655 0.744
3 1.802 0.964 2.942 0.998 2.254 0.988
4 5.477 1.000 6.091 1.000 7.211 1.000
b) Pesaran (2007) CIPS test: Constant and deterministic trend
Lags lis (p) q (p) rp (p)
0 1.044 0.852 -2.068 0.019 2.483 0.993
1 0.390 0.652 -1.628 0.052 2.052 0.980
2 -0.033 0.487 1.304 0.904 0.998 0.841
3 5.280 1.000 6.785 1.000 6.006 1.000
4 8.090 1.000 8.949 1.000 9.127 1.000
Notes: Pesaran (2007) CIPS test values are obtained from the standardized Z-tbar statistic.
H0 = nonstationarity. Lags indicates the number of lags included in the ADF regression.
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Table D2 shows the Pesaran (2004) CD test for cross-section dependence in panel time-
series data. This test uses correlation coefficients between the time-series for each panel
member and has proved to be robust to nonstationarity, parameter heterogeneity and
structural breaks, even in small samples.65 Table D2 is divided in four different quadrants
representing different variable transformations. Quadrants a) and b) present the CD test
for the levels and growth rates of our variables, and show that the null hypothesis of
cross-section independence is rejected in all the cases. Quadrants c) and d) complement
the analysis by checking the power of the cross-section averages to control for cross-section
dependence. In particular, they present the results for the Pesaran (2004) CD test when
it is applied to the residuals of an autoregressive regression of order 2 for each variable of
interest. While regressions in quadrant c) are estimated by the Pesaran and Smith (1995)
Mean Group estimator, panel d) shows the results when the AR process is augmented
with cross-section averages in the spirit of Pesaran’s (2006) CMG estimator. We can
see that, while all the variables reject the null of cross-section independence in panel c),
the inclusion of cross-sectional averages in panel d) alleviates the problem for the labor
income share and Tobin’s Q.
Table D2: Cross-section Dependence Tests
a) Levels: b) Diff:
Variable lis q rp Variable ∆lis ∆q ∆rp
CD-test 16.73 29.76 42.37 CD-test 12.99 34.45 6.66
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
corr 0.132 0.250 0.345 corr 0.11 0.296 0.049
abs(corr) 0.472 0.394 0.558 abs(corr) 0.235 0.349 0.223
c) Het. AR(2) d) Het. AR(2) CCE
Variable lis q rp Variable lis q rp
CD-test 9.93 33.58 3.40 CD-test -0.24 -0.66 -2.38
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 p-value 0.81 0.51 0.02
corr 0.088 0.301 0.027 corr -0.006 -0.011 -0.023
abs(corr) 0.243 0.344 0.213 abs(corr) 0.220 0.237 0.213
Notes: CD-test shows the Pesaran (2004) cross-section dependence statistic, which follows a N(0, 1)
distribution. H0 = cross-section independence. corr, and abs(corr) report, respectively, the average and
average absolute correlation coefficients across the N(N − 1) set of correlations.
65The test is computed as:
CD =
√
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
√
Tijρij ,
where ρij represents the correlation coefficient between country i and j, while Tij is the number of
observations used to computed that correlation.
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